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887 
COMBATING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 




Prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is rampant. Prosecutors 
make improper arguments because it is a highly effective, yet virtually risk-
free, strategy. That is, even if the defense lawyer quickly identifies and 
objects to the misconduct, the jury has already heard the improper 
argument, the available remedies are toothless, and the offending 
prosecutor rarely suffers any consequences. This Article proposes an 
alternative approach for combating this problem. Rather than waiting to 
object until after the prosecutor makes the improper argument, defense 
counsel should consider a more aggressive strategy: the pretrial motion in 
limine. This motion seeks a pretrial order to prevent the misconduct before 
it occurs, and in cases where the prosecutor violates the order, it 
establishes a framework for addressing the misconduct in a meaningful 
way. 
This preemptive strategy has several advantages over the conventional, 
reactionary approach. First, even if the motion in limine fails to deter the 
misconduct, it alerts the trial judge to the improper arguments before the 
prosecutor makes them. Second, it preserves the issue for meaningful trial-
court review, outside of the jury’s presence, without defense counsel having 
to raise difficult and risky objections in the middle of closing arguments. 
Third, the motion-in-limine approach also provides a framework for 
developing meaningful remedies for the misconduct. These include 
providing the opportunity to draft thoughtful and effective curative 
instructions and affording time for client consultation before requesting the 
more serious remedy of a mistrial. And fourth, in the event a mistrial is 
declared, the motion-in-limine approach may even protect the defendant 
from re-prosecution.  
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Introduction 
When a prosecutor makes improper closing arguments to a jury, he or 
she violates the defendant’s due process and other constitutional rights. Yet, 
despite the prosecutor’s supposed role as “minister of justice,” rampant 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument still exists. Anecdotal reports, 
appellate court decisions, and even published studies demonstrate that such 
misconduct has become the norm rather than the exception. 
Prosecutors abuse the closing argument process for two primary reasons. 
First, they know that improper arguments are highly effective, stirring 
jurors’ emotions and inviting them to convict for reasons other than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, and equally important, prosecutors 
have learned that this form of misconduct is virtually risk free: the difficulty 
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defense lawyers face in quickly identifying and immediately responding to 
improper arguments typically results in the prosecutor’s misconduct going 
unchecked and the state gaining an illegal advantage without repercussion. 
Moreover, even when the defense lawyer is able to quickly identify and 
object to the misconduct, doing so may cause more harm than good. 
Further, the available remedies are often ineffective. 
Worse yet, the conventional, reactionary approach to improper argument 
only encourages this form of prosecutorial misconduct. This Article 
therefore proposes a more aggressive strategy for combating—and possibly 
even deterring—prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments: the pretrial 
motion in limine.  
Part I discusses the importance of closing arguments and the widespread 
nature of prosecutorial misconduct in this phase of the criminal trial. Part II 
takes the first step in combating this form of misconduct by helping the 
defense lawyer identify and understand many common forms of improper 
argument. Part III examines the numerous problems with the conventional, 
after-the-fact approach to dealing with prosecutorial misconduct, including 
the risks associated with objecting in the middle of closing arguments and 
the general ineffectiveness of the available remedies when an objection is 
sustained.  
Part IV of this Article then outlines the alternative approach to 
combating this form of prosecutorial misconduct. Instead of waiting for the 
improper argument and then objecting after the jury hears it, defense 
counsel should anticipate and preempt the misconduct via a pretrial motion 
in limine. This motion-in-limine approach educates the trial judge about the 
various forms of improper argument, seeks a pretrial order prohibiting these 
arguments before the prosecutor can make them, and protects the defendant 
in the event the prosecutor violates the court’s order. If granted, the pretrial 
motion in limine relieves defense counsel from having to raise risky, mid-
argument objections to the misconduct, yet still preserves the issue for trial- 
and appellate-court review. The motion in limine also establishes a 
framework for developing meaningful remedies for the prosecutor’s 
unethical behavior. It provides defense counsel and the trial judge the 
opportunity to craft effective curative instructions and affords defense 
counsel sufficient time to consult with the defendant before requesting the 
serious remedy of a mistrial. Further, in the event the court grants a mistrial 
request, the motion-in-limine approach may even protect the defendant 
from a retrial.  
Appendix A provides a sample motion in limine, and Appendix B 
provides sample curative instructions tailored to specific types of improper 
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arguments. Such instructions can, in some cases, provide an adequate 
remedy for the prosecutor’s misconduct. 
I. Closing Arguments to the Jury 
Closing arguments are “often viewed as the most important part of the 
trial, providing the attorneys with their last opportunity to convince the jury 
of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”
1
 More specifically, the closing 
argument allows the attorneys “to sum up the evidence within a narrative 
framework to help the jury understand and interpret the evidence.”
2
 This 
includes arguing about the “reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence,” the “credibility and demeanor of witnesses,” and the “credibility 
of evidence generally.”
3
 The attorneys may also “help the jury understand 
the issues by applying the evidence to the law.”
4
 In the rebuttal portion of 




With regard to criminal prosecutions, courts have stated that the 
prosecutor “occupies a semijudicial position,”
6
 and the rules of professional 
conduct have grandly ordained the prosecutor as “minister of justice.”
7
 
Consequently, “a prosecutor’s duty, above being an advocate for the State, 
is to ensure that a defendant is afforded a fair trial.”
8
 Yet, despite these 
grand titles and lofty standards, prosecutorial misconduct is rampant in 
closing argument, its variety limited only by the prosecutor’s imagination 
                                                                                                             
 1. Michael Lyon, Avoiding the Woodshed: The Third Circuit Examines Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in Closing Argument in United States v. Wood, 53 VILL. L. REV. 689, 689 
(2008) (citing Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 113 
(1994)).  
 2. Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 320 (2015) 
(citing Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 
TEX. L. REV. 629, 643 (1972)). 
 3. J. Thomas Sullivan, Prosecutor Misconduct in Closing Argument in Arkansas 
Criminal Trials, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 213, 219 (1998) (first citing Richmond v. 
State, 899 S.W.2d 64 (Ark. 1999); then citing Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1996)). 
 4. Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 963 (Fla. 1996).  
 5. Bowman, supra note 2, at 320 (citing Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to 
Cross the Line in Closing Arguments: An Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2001)). 
 6. Roach v. State, 146 So. 240, 240 (Fla. 1933). 
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  
 8. Claire Gagnon, A Liar by Any Other Name? Iowa’s Closing Argument Conundrum, 
55 DRAKE L. REV. 471, 478 (2007) (citing State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 876 (Iowa 
2003)). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/4





 In many cases, improper prosecutorial arguments violate a 
defendant’s due process rights
10




A prosecutor often commits this form of misconduct because, by the end 
of the jury trial, he or she “may have become so devoted to winning the 
case . . . that his or her emotions intrude and result in a ‘win at all costs’ 
closing argument not based on the facts brought out during trial.”
12
 One 
explanation for this behavior is that “[c]onfirmation bias leads prosecutors 
to be overconfident in their conclusions about the guilt of particular 
defendants.”
13
 This process is often set in motion when the prosecutor’s 
office first receives a referral from law enforcement and, despite having 
limited information, concludes that the suspect is guilty.
14
 Then, throughout 
the case, the prosecutor focuses on information that confirms this 
preexisting determination of guilt while discounting—or even ignoring—
information that contradicts it.
15
 
Regardless of the underlying explanation, prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing argument can be incredibly harmful. “Although argument does not 
constitute evidence and the jury is instructed not to consider it as such, the 
use of dramatic, compelling, or even inflammatory argument reflects a 
perception that argument is a valuable ingredient of the deliberative 
process. . . .”
16
 And scientific evidence supports this perception: “Empirical 
research on the ‘recency effect’ suggests that people tend to remember best 
                                                                                                             
 9. See infra Part II.  
 10. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Iowa 2003); State v. Singh, 793 
A.2d 226, 232 (Conn. 2002).  
 11. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (finding that the 
prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify was improper and violated 
the Fifth Amendment); State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 589 (Tenn. 2014) (same); State v. 
Jorgensen, 754 N.W.2d 77, 90 (Wis. 2008) (stating that the prosecutor’s argument about 
facts not adduced at trial violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation).  
 12. Candice D. Tobin, Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument: Florida 
Case Law, 22 NOVA L. REV. 485, 488 (1997).  
 13. Bowman, supra note 2, at 329 (citing Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The 
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 371). 
 14. See id. (citing Findlay & Scott, supra note 13, at 329–30) (“The information 
provided to prosecutors may be incomplete because the police investigation may have been 
shaped by tunnel vision.”).  
 15. See id. (citing Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that 
Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 315, 316 (2009)) (“Because of confirmation bias, people unwittingly select and 
interpret information to support their preexisting beliefs.”).  
 16. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 214.  
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and be influenced by the latest event in a sequence more than by earlier 
events.”
17
 Because jurors enter deliberations with closing arguments—
especially the prosecutor’s rebuttal—still ringing in their ears, those words 




Although other empirical research demonstrates that some jurors will 
have made up their minds by the time closing argument begins,
19
 such 
findings do not minimize the harmful effects of the prosecutor’s 
misconduct. Even though some jurors may have already decided the 
defendant’s guilt, the prosecutor’s closing argument provides “ammunition 




Further, prosecutorial misconduct may be as frequent as it is harmful. As 
far back as 1987, for example, one judge conceded that prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument is “chronicled with alarming regularity.”
21
 
Nonetheless, he maintained that the “majority of prosecutors . . . desire to 
see that justice is done rather than to add another conviction to their 
record.”
22
 But attributing the misconduct to only a few bad apples was 
probably a naïve claim, even in 1987. Today, any criminal defense lawyer 
who adopts such a trusting approach does so at his or her client’s peril. In 
my own experience, the majority of prosecutors routinely make improper 
arguments to the jury—indeed, prosecutorial misconduct in closing 
argument seems to be the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, some 
forms of improper argument are deployed with such frequency, and by so 
many different prosecutors, that there is reason to speculate that such 
arguments may be a part of the prosecutors’ training. And much of the 
empirical evidence on the pervasiveness of such misconduct supports this 
                                                                                                             
 17. Bowman, supra note 2, at 344 (emphasis added) (citing Ryan Patrick Alford, 
Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas Review of Summation Misconduct: Persuasion 
Theory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Unbiased Jury, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 518 
(2006)). 
 18. See Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing 
Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1149 
(2002) (“[I]n most cases, the prosecutor’s final closing argument will be the last words that 
the . . . jury hears from either attorney.”). 
 19. See Gagnon, supra note 8, at 474.  
 20. Bowman, supra note 2, at 343 (quoting H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art and 
Architecture of Closing Argument, 76 TUL. L. REV. 961, 972 (2002)).  
 21. Frank D. Celebrezze, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Quelling the Tide of Improper 
Comment to the Jury, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 237, 238 (1987). 
 22. Id. at 247. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/4





 Therefore, the well-prepared criminal defense lawyer 
must enter each jury trial expecting the prosecutor to strike “foul blows.”
24
  
The reason for this miserable state of affairs is twofold. First, prosecutors 
know they are likely to get away with this form of misbehavior, as 
“misconduct in jury argument proves to be one of the most difficult 
problems to address for criminal defense counsel.”
25
 This is because 
defense lawyers are unable to recognize many forms of improper argument 
and, even when they do, the misconduct typically happens too quickly to 
mount a thoughtful and effective response.
26
 
And second, appellate courts have proven to be highly tolerant of this 
form of prosecutorial misconduct. For example, in Briggs v. State, the 
defendant’s appellate lawyer argued that the Florida Court of Appeals had 
repeatedly warned prosecutors that a particular type of argument was 
unethical and constituted misconduct.
27
 As such, the lawyer asked the court 
to make good on its seven previous warnings to prosecutors and order a 




The court’s response to the lawyer’s request was the same as its response 
in the previous seven cases cited by the appellate lawyer: “If [the improper 
argument] continues, the appellate courts will be compelled, as appellant’s 
counsel argues, to fashion a special remedy and reverse convictions so 
obtained to provide an effective means of deterring further misconduct.”
29
 
Despite this further admonishment, however, the court again failed to act in 
a meaningful way to protect Briggs (and other future defendants) from 
                                                                                                             
 23. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 2, at 332 (discussing an empirical study 
demonstrating pervasive prosecutorial misconduct in California criminal trials); Paul J. 
Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate 
Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 120 (1999) (discussing evidence of “‘prosecutorial 
recidivism’—the tendency of the same prosecutor or office to engage in misconduct 
repeatedly, even in the face of admonishments from the court”). 
 24. Bowman, supra note 2, at 312 (citing the landmark case of Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78 (1935), noting the “striking gap” between “the strong rhetoric of Berger and . . . 
the realities of prosecutors’ behavior,” and explaining how Berger’s condemnation of 
prosecutorial misconduct is “routinely cited but largely ignored”). 
 25. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 214. 
 26. See Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective 
Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 340-42 (2007) 
(discussing the challenges facing defense lawyers when attempting to deal with trial 
misconduct generally). 
 27. Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 521–22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 28. Id. at 522. 
 29. Id. (emphasis added).  
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prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors do not fear such tired judicial 
mantras, though, as evidenced the court’s own admission that “for over 30 
years such prosecutorial tactics have been disapproved of, yet they continue 
to occur.”
30
 In the absence of meaningful action to prevent such 
misconduct, prosecutors have accurately interpreted the court’s eighth 
warning as yet another idle threat in a very long line of idle threats.  
A California appellate court dealt with prosecutorial misconduct by using 
similarly empty warnings. After repeated incidents of misconduct by the 
same prosecutor in several cases, the court bemoaned: 
[I]t is disheartening, to say the least, to learn that [the prosecutor] 
takes ‘pride’ in our admonitions, apparently because we did not 
reverse the judgment rendered. We most earnestly urge counsel 
to reconsider her approach lest in the future it becomes necessary 
for us to reverse otherwise sustainable convictions . . ..
31
  
The problem for California defendants, however, is the same as that faced 
by Florida defendants: the future never comes.  
For many decades, other courts throughout the country have dealt 
similarly with the problem of prosecutorial misconduct, issuing myriad 
warnings to prosecutors to stop making improper closing arguments.
32
 
However, as in Florida and California, these judicial threats are nearly 
always empty and free of consequence for the offending prosecutors. 
While most appellate judges timidly ask prosecutors to abide by the rules 
of ethics and trial procedure, one judge has recognized that this “attitude of 
helpless piety is, I think, undesirable.”
33
 Such an attitude is indeed 
“undesirable” for three reasons. First, it demonstrates that appellate courts 
are unable to control the prosecutorial monster they have helped create, thus 
exposing the courts’ ineffectiveness (or, at bare minimum, unwillingness) 
to put an end to the conduct. Second, and more significantly, such “helpless 
piety” does nothing for the defendants who were victimized by the 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id.  
 31. People v. Congious, No. B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (emphasis added), 
quoted in Cicchini, supra note 26, at 348. 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978) (“Unfortunately, 
such improprieties are not rare grounds for appeal in this Circuit, and neither are our . . . 
cautions to the government in such cases.”) (examining numerous cases involving improper 
arguments).  
 33. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, 
J., dissenting). 
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prosecutor’s misconduct. And third, it certainly does nothing to prevent the 
victimization of future defendants. 
Given the current state of affairs, what, if anything, can criminal defense 
lawyers do at the trial-court level to protect their clients? Rather than 
waiting until closing statements to react to improper arguments made by the 
prosecutor, defense lawyers should take preemptive measures in order to 




II. Recognizing Improper Arguments 
Battling prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument begins with 
learning what constitutes an improper argument. Part I of this Article set 
forth the bounds of a legally proper argument.
35
 In theory, then, anything 
outside of those bounds is improper. But such a formulation is not easily 
applied in practice. Therefore, the following sections provide concrete 
examples of improper arguments grouped into general categories, the goal 
of which is to make it easier for the criminal defense lawyer to recognize 
prosecutorial misconduct when he or she hears it at trial.  
It is important, however, to keep three things in mind. First, this Article 
makes no attempt to list all examples—or even to identify all categories—
of improper argument. The variations of misconduct in closing arguments 
are far too numerous to be easily catalogued in a single article. Second, 
while there is broad agreement across jurisdictions as to what constitutes an 
improper argument, the determination sometimes depends on the law of the 
specific federal circuit, state, or federal district within a state. And third, for 
some types of prosecutorial argument, what qualifies as improper may 
depend upon the facts of the particular case.
36
 
Given this, every defense lawyer must become familiar with the law 
applicable to his or her case and, equally important, must understand how 
that law applies to different factual scenarios. Keeping these caveats in 
mind, what follow are examples of common—but often improper—closing 
arguments. 
  
                                                                                                             
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. 
 36. For a single case that highlights the importance of a facts-and-circumstances 
analysis and also demonstrates differences between the law of two jurisdictions, see 
Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1254-56 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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A. Testifying: You’re Damned if You Do 
As late as the 1960s, some prosecutors were able to win convictions by 
preventing defendants from testifying at trial.
37
 Today, however, courts 
recognize a defendant’s constitutional right to testify in his or her own 
defense.
38
 And to ensure this right has real meaning, courts often instruct 
juries that “you should not discredit the testimony just because the 
defendant is charged with a crime.”
39
 Yet prosecutors have developed 
arguments to accomplish exactly what the law prohibits: they urge juries to 
disregard the defendant’s testimony simply because he or she is the 
defendant. For example, one prosecutor argued to the jury:  
“[W]hat’s her interest, bias or prejudice? Well, she’s the 
Defendant here, she stands a chance of getting convicted. That’s 
one very large reason she should have of trying to slant her 
testimony, of trying to shift the blame away. It’s not pleasant to 
be convicted, especially at her age.”
40
  
In a different case, the prosecutor similarly argued: 
“[W]hat is his interest, bias or prejudice? Well, he’s the one on 
trial here. You recall his testimony. He’s a 17 year old male 
attending [high school], getting ready to enter into adulthood. Do 




In both cases, the Illinois court held that this type of argument was 
improper as it “implied that the defendant lied simply because of his [or 
                                                                                                             
 37. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 571 (1961) (“In this case, a jury . . . 
convicted the appellant of murder, and he is under sentence of death. After the State rested 
its case at the trial, the appellant’s counsel called him to the stand, but the trial judge 
sustained the State’s objection to counsel’s attempt to question him.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) (finding that a “rule excluding 
all posthypnosis testimony infringers impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on 
his own behalf”); see also Timothy P. O’Neill, Vindicating the Defendant’s Constitutional 
Right to Testify at a Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 809, 809 (1990) (“[T]he Supreme Court has directly held that a criminal defendant has 
a constitutional right to testify at her trial.”).  
 39. WIS. J.I. CRIM. 300 (2016) (emphasis added).  
 40. People v. Crowder, 607 N.E.2d 277, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 41. People v. Watts, 588 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Apparently, age is a no-
win factor for a defendant; whether young or old, the prosecutor will spin it into evidence of 
perjury.  
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her] status as a defendant.”
42
 In other words, arguing that a defendant’s 
testimony should be discredited, dismissed, or ignored because he or she is 
the defendant is, in substance, the equivalent of preventing him or her from 
testifying in the first place—something the Supreme Court has already 
deemed unconstitutional.
43
 The prosecutor must not be allowed to 
accomplish the same end by different means. 
Worse yet, this prosecutorial argument violates an even more important 
constitutional principle: the presumption of innocence. This can be 
demonstrated in three simple but irrefutable steps. First, in any criminal 
case involving the defendant’s testimony, the prosecutor takes the position 
that the defendant is guilty, but the defendant testifies that he or she is 
innocent. Second, to argue that the defendant is lying (or slanting his or her 
testimony or shifting blame) because of his or her status as a defendant 
necessarily implies that the defendant is guilty. That, after all, is the whole 
point of the prosecutor’s argument. And third, to argue that a person is 
guilty merely because he or she has been charged with a crime is blatantly 
unconstitutional, as such arguments “diminish the defendant’s fundamental 
right to the presumption of innocence.”
44
 
Whether based on the defendant’s right to testify or his or her right to a 
presumption of innocence, arguments that the defendant’s testimony should 
be disregarded based solely on his or her status as the defendant are 
improper; defense counsel must be able to recognize when the prosecutor is 
engaging in misconduct by making such arguments.  
B. Testifying: You’re Damned if You Don’t 
For a variety of reasons, many defendants choose to exercise their 
constitutional right to remain silent at trial. “It is not every one who can 
safely venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent of the charge 
against him.”
45
 And the law is clear: a defendant “has a right to a jury 
instruction that his silence is not evidence of his guilt.”
46
 Yet, in cases 
where defendants elect to remain silent, prosecutors are quick to spin this 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id.; cf. People v. Armstrong, 655 N.E.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“We 
respectfully disagree with our esteemed colleagues [who decided Crowder and Watts]. . . . 
Surely the fact that the defendants were charged . . . constituted a bias affecting the 
credibility of these defendants.”).  
 43. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
 44. Crowder, 607 N.E.2d at 280.  
 45. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).  
 46. Sharon R. Gromer, Fifth Amendment—The Right to a No “Adverse Inference” Jury 
Instruction, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1307, 1307 (1981). 
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silence to the government’s advantage.
47
 Modern prosecutors normally do 
not explicitly argue that a defendant’s silence at trial means that he or she is 
guilty. Such a bold claim would be a blatant (but not necessarily reversible) 
error.
48
 Instead, prosecutors “seem to keep coming up with arguments 
which can have a double meaning,”
49
 thus maintaining the thrust of the 
message, while at the same time giving the abusive prosecutors plausible—
or in many cases, implausible—deniability.  
Improper comments on the defendant’s decision not to testify appear in 
seemingly infinite variety. In one recent case, a prosecutor began rebuttal 
argument “by walking across the court room, facing Defendant, and 
declaring in a loud voice, while raising both arms to point at and gesture 




In a more subtle example, another prosecutor argued to a jury that “God 
forbid you should believe a police officer whose testimony went 
uncontradicted by these Defendants.”
51
 Similarly, another prosecutor 
argued that there were only two people present for an alleged sexual 
assault, and the “rape victim was the only person to have testified 




In perhaps the height of craftiness, another prosecutor argued to the 
jurors that they “should not take into consideration in any way the fact that 
[the] defendant did not testify,” which the court held was a disguised but 
                                                                                                             
 47. This Article addresses only improper arguments regarding the defendant’s decision 
to remain silent at trial. It does not address pretrial silence, the admissibility of which could 
turn on whether the defendant testifies at trial and whether the pre-trial silence occurred 
before or after Miranda warnings. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How 
Seibert and Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 647 (2006) 
(discussing the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence). 
 48. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 230-31 n.98 (discussing the Court’s use of the 
“harmless error” test as a way to uphold convictions despite prosecutorial comments on the 
defendant’s silence). 
 49. Spry v. State, 664 So. 2d 41, 41-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).  
 50. State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 585 (Tenn. 2014) (finding argument improper 
and reversible error). 
 51. Knight v. State, 672 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added) 
(finding argument improper and reversible error).  
 52. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 232 (emphasis added) (discussing Bailey v. State, 697 
S.W.2d 110 (Ark. 1985) (finding argument improper and reversible error)); see also 
Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding argument improper and 
reversible error because the defendant was the only person who could have rebutted the 
state’s evidence). 
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“deliberate attempt to call attention to defendant’s failure to testify.”
53
 
Regardless of the form of the argument, however, any direct, indirect, or 
even disguised comment on the defendant’s silence violates the defendant’s 
due process rights and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and are therefore improper. 
C. Liar, Liar (and other Name Calling) 
Prosecutors sometimes argue that defendants are not believable simply 
because they are charged with a crime. Other times, however, prosecutors 
are more direct and simply call the defendant (or other defense witness) a 
liar or brand the person with equally harmful labels. 
In some jurisdictions, calling the defendant a liar is, at least in theory, 
per se improper as it is considered an inflammatory label.
54
 In other 
jurisdictions, prosecutors may get away with such name-calling if it is 
closely tied to evidence adduced at trial. For example, when “the witness 
told four different stories” when testifying, it may be proper to discuss 
those conflicting stories and then argue that the witness is “the biggest liar 
in [the] [c]ounty.”
55
 That is, it may be permissible “to call the defendant or 




Prosecutors are often creative and build upon the words “lie” or “lying” 
or “liar.” One prosecutor went well beyond the pale in closing argument 
when discussing the defendant’s testimony: 
Joseph Goebbels, who was a propaganda minister for Germany 
back at the time of Adolf Hitler, had a theory. He believed that 
you should lie to the people but that you shouldn’t lie with small 
lies because you can get caught in small lies. What you should 
do is you should lie big, come up with a big lie because that’s 
something that you might be able to have the people buy is the 
big lie. Of course, at that time it was that the Jews were 
                                                                                                             
 53. Spiegelman, supra note 23, at 138 n.89 (discussing United States v. Roberts, 119 
F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding argument improper and, when combined with other 
errors, reversible error)).  
 54. See Gagnon, supra note 8, at 483-84 (discussing how Iowa’s supposed “bright line 
test” is “not all that bright”); see also O’Callaghan v. State, 429 So.2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1983) 
(stating that it is “unquestionably improper” to call the defendant a liar). 
 55. Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 914 (11th Cir. 2001).  
 56. People v. Starks, 451 N.E.2d 1298, 1305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); see also Craig v. 
State, 510 So. 2d 857, 865 (Fla. 1987) (finding that the prosecutor may call defendant a liar 
if supported by the trial evidence).  
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responsible for everything that was wrong in the world and they 
should be exterminated. Well, the defense in this case is nothing 
but a big lie.
57
 
Most prosecutors aren’t brash enough to invoke Nazi Germany and then 
strain to find a way to associate the defendant with it. Many prosecutors 
will, however, brand the defendant with other negative labels in addition to 
that of liar. Depending on the facts of the case and the nature of the 







 could very well be considered inflammatory, 
improper, and even reversible error.  
D. Disparaging the Defense Lawyer  
When prosecutors aren’t criticizing the defendant or the defendant’s 
witnesses, they are often disparaging the defendant’s lawyer. This type of 
argument is improper because it “can prejudice the defendant by . . . 




Attacks on defense counsel can take several forms, beginning with 
criticism disguised as compliment. For example, in a classic case of false 
flattery, one prosecutor “backhandedly compliment[ed] defense counsel on 
his skill in confusing the alleged victim of a sexual assault when cross-
examining her,” and then distinguished the dishonorable goals of the 
defense lawyer from the noble objectives of “the government and the 
judge.”
62
 More commonly, prosecutors go after defense counsel via a “more 
direct” route.
63
 Instead of arguing about the evidence, many prosecutors 
have attacked “the personal integrity of defense counsel by suggesting that 
counsel was not being truthful.”
64
 Not mincing words, one prosecutor told 
                                                                                                             
 57. Washington v. State, 687 So. 2d 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 58. Mays v. State, 571 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Ark. 1978).  
 59. Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969).  
 60. State v. McGregor, 244 So. 2d 846, 846 (La. 1971).  
 61. United States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 62. Spiegelman, supra note 23, at 136 n.83 (discussing United States v. Frederick, 78 
F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding argument improper and, when combined with other 
errors, reversible error)). 
 63. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 246 (discussing indirect and direct attacks on defense 
counsel by the prosecutor). 
 64. Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding argument 
improper but also harmless error).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/4
2018]       MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS 901 
 
 




Such misconduct in closing argument “evidences an excessive 
preoccupation with obtaining a conviction at any cost.”
66
 And when 
prosecutors employ this strategy, “the state’s closing argument may cause 
one to wonder who is on trial, the defendant or the defense counsel.”
67
 In 
perhaps the most extreme (and literal) example of putting the defense 
lawyer on trial, one prosecutor in an incest case “suggested that defense 
counsel was also guilty of incest.”
68
 
Another variation on this anti-defense-lawyer theme does not attack the 
defense lawyer as an individual, but instead attacks his or her role in the 
criminal justice system. For example, one prosecutor argued that, while the 
prosecutor’s job is to “determine whether I believe a person is guilty and 
whether I think [the prosecution is] just,” the “defense counsel’s job is to 
get his client off the hook. That’s his only job here, not to see justice is 
done but to see that his client is acquitted.”
69
 This common twist on this 
form of improper argument allows prosecutors to kill two birds with one 
stone: anointing themselves as justice-seekers while at the same time 
branding defense lawyers as obfuscators.
70
 
Prosecutors continue to make these and similar arguments even though 
courts have repeatedly stated that such “disparaging remarks directed at 
defense counsel are reprehensible.”
71
 In a broader sense, such remarks also 
“detract from the dignity of judicial proceedings.”
72
 As such, regardless of 
the prosecutor’s angle, all forms of argument directed at defense counsel 
should be considered improper.  
                                                                                                             
 65. State v. Lyles, 996 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding argument 
improper but not preserved at the post-conviction level and not sufficient to reverse under 
the higher standard of plain error).  
 66. Briggs, 455 So. 2d at 520.  
 67. Tobin, supra note 12, at 495.  
 68. See id. at 495-96 n.78; see also Douglass v. State, 184 So. 756, 757 (Fla. 1938). 
 69. State v. Mayo, 734 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Wis. 2007) (finding argument improper but 
not properly preserved at trial and not sufficient to reverse under the ineffective assistance of 
counsel standard, plain error standard, or interests of justice standard). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1990) (arguing 
that the role of the defense lawyer is to “try to get them off, perhaps even for high fees”); 
Wilson v. State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (arguing that defense counsel 
wishes “that you turn a guilty man free” and “he can wish that because he doesn’t have the 
obligation to see that justice is done”); People v. Hunt, 242 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1976) (arguing that “defense counsel’s job was ‘to get his man acquitted’”). 
 71. United States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 72. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
902 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:887 
 
 
E. Vouching and Personal Opinion 
Vouching is likely the most common form of improper argument, but its 
numerous variations can make it difficult to identify. In general, a 
prosecutor vouches when he or she gives a personal opinion about the 
defendant’s guilt or about a particular piece of evidence.
73
 This can be 
problematic, as “[r]esearch consistently shows that jurors inherently find 
prosecutors to be more credible than defense counsel.”
74
 Therefore, “it is 
improper . . . for a prosecutor to express a personal belief in the guilt of the 
accused, or in the veracity of the state’s witnesses.”
75
  
 Although it occurs with some frequency, “[m]ost courts conclude that it 
is misconduct for prosecutors to make ‘I’ statements such as ‘I think’ or ‘I 
believe.’”
76
 Some obvious examples of such blatant vouching include, “I 
think the defendant is guilty,” or, “I believe the victim testified truthfully.” 
Some courts will let prosecutors get away with vouching, however, if the “I 
think” or “I believe” statements are properly disguised. Examples might 
include, “I think the evidence in this case shows the defendant is guilty,” or 
“I think the physical evidence proves the victim told the truth.” Therefore, 




In most cases, prosecutors express their personal opinion of the 
defendant’s guilt indirectly by giving their opinion that the government’s 
witnesses testified truthfully and therefore the jury should believe them. 
Prosecutors indirectly vouch for many types of government witnesses, but 
they most commonly do so for the police. That is, prosecutors make 
“inappropriate attempt[s] to persuade the jury that the police officer’s 




While offering a personal opinion is, by itself, improper, many 
prosecutors compound this offense by bolstering their opinions with 
reference to matters outside of the record. One prosecutor, for example, 
bolstered his personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt by explaining to the 
jury, “I look up police reports. . . . I determine whether I believe a person is 
                                                                                                             
 73. See Bowman, supra note 2, at 321. 
 74. Id. at 322-23.  
 75. Tobin, supra note 12, at 503. 
 76. Bowman, supra note 2, at 321-22. 
 77. See Craig Lee Montz, Trial Objections from Beginning to End: The Handbook for 
Civil and Criminal Trials, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 243, 307-08 (2002) (discussing cases where the 
prosecutor’s personal opinions were permitted). 
 78. Cisneros v. State, 678 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
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guilty and whether I think it’s just. I also have the discretion . . . to dismiss 




While vouching for several police officers, another prosecutor argued 
that the police witnesses must be believed because, before they can become 
police officers, they “take oaths to follow the law and so do not ‘stick’ 
people with charges.”
80
 The prosecutor specifically argued that, during their 
induction ceremonies, “Officer Gammon took an oath to uphold the laws” 
and “Detective Arkins took the same oath.”
81
 Therefore, in order to acquit 
the defendant, the prosecutor contended, the jurors would have to believe 
these police witnesses consciously violated their oaths, as well as their 
oaths at trial, and “lied on the stand.”
82
 Such vouching, especially when 
based on facts not in evidence, constitutes misconduct by the prosecutor. 
F. Prosecutor “Testimony” 
When prosecutors aren’t vouching for the state’s witnesses or evidence, 
they sometimes offer their own testimony, thus creating evidence out of 
thin air. Although the law is clear that “counsel has no right to create 
evidence or to misstate the facts”
83
 and that any “[a]rgument on matters not 
in evidence is improper,”
84
 prosecutors often “testify” in closing argument 
nonetheless. 
The most egregious example of prosecutor testimony occurs when a 
prosecutor argues facts that he or she knows to be false. For example, in 
one case a prosecutor argued to the jury that the defendant “never denied 
[committing] the crime until he got on the witness stand.”
85
 This might have 
been a proper argument had there been evidence at trial of the defendant’s 
pre-arrest and pre-Miranda silence. But in this case, the prosecutor “knew 
                                                                                                             
 79. State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶ 16, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115 (alterations in 
original). 
 80. United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 1993); see also United States v. 
Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing in part for prosecutor misstating evidence); 
United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (reversal for prosecutor’s repeated, 
incorrect claims about the evidence); Bowman, supra note 2, at 323 (“For example, 
prosecutors commit misconduct when they exaggerate what the testimony shows, including 
forensic evidence.”).  
 84. State v. Neuser, 528 N.W.2d 49, 54 (Ct. App. Wis. 1995) (quoting State v. Albright, 
298 N.W.2d 196, 203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)).  
 85. State v. Weiss, 2008 WI App 72, ¶ 15, 312 Wis. 2d 382, 752 N.W.2d 372.  
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better” because she had two different police reports detailing how the 
defendant had denied committing the crime long before he took the witness 
stand.
86
 The argument was therefore improper, as “[p]rosecutors may not 
ask jurors to draw inferences that they know or should know are not true.”
87
  
In other cases, prosecutors argue facts that might be true but prevent the 
introduction of evidence proving or disproving the facts and deny defense 
counsel the opportunity to challenge the facts by waiting to discuss them 
until closing arguments. This tactic violates both due process and the right 
of confrontation: “Testimony from a prosecutor is difficult enough to 
overcome, but it is impossible for a defendant to test or counter a 
prosecutor’s ‘testimony’ when the defendant is denied his right to confront 
the prosecutor as a witness.”
88
 
In one example of this tactic, a defendant testified he was out-of-town “at 
the Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas at the time” in question.
89
 Instead of 
presenting contrary evidence at trial, the prosecutor waited until closing 
argument and “testified” that he knew the defendant was not at the Luxor 
because, the prosecutor said, “I was able to have members of my staff 
telephone the Luxor,” thus implying that the defendant had lied.
90
 In a 
different case—one alleging child sexual assault—a prosecutor argued that, 
because the defendant “had been sexually abused” herself as a child, she 
was “more likely to have committed the alleged sexual assaults in this 
case.”
91
 This prosecutorial testimony was a twist on the “battering parent 




The above examples are relatively easy for defense counsel to recognize. 
Sometimes, however, prosecutors do a better job of disguising their factual 
assertions as argument. For example, one prosecutor argued that the 
defendant in a drug case was able to post his $10,000 bond because he 
“could go out the next day and make $10,000 up on one transaction.”
93
 This 
was improper because, during the evidence portion of trial, the prosecutor 
did not “even attempt to prove that [the defendant] had received any money 
                                                                                                             
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶ 38, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77. 
 89. Cicchini, supra note 26, at 353.  
 90. Id. 
 91. State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325, 335 (Wis. 1990). 
 92. Id. at 336. 
 93. United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1978). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/4
2018]       MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS 905 
 
 
as a result of any [drug] deals”—not even the alleged delivery with which 
the defendant was charged.
94
  
In another case, a defendant was charged with arson, and the government 
had seized his clothing to test for gasoline.
95
 Defense counsel properly 
argued that the test came back negative, thus pointing to the defendant’s 
innocence. The prosecutor, however, responded “by speculating that the 
reason for that fact could be that the defendant had destroyed the clothes” 
he wore when committing the crime.
96
 The court held that such argument 
“was improper because it suggests a course of conduct by the defendant . . . 
for which there was no evidence.”
97
 
In a closely related tactic, prosecutors may instead misuse a piece of 
evidence that was presented at trial. One amazingly creative prosecutor, for 
example, argued that a defense witness’s prior conviction—a conviction 
admitted into evidence only to impeach that witness’s credibility
98
—was 
somehow evidence that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he 
was on trial.
99
 Regardless of whether the prosecutor is creating evidence out 
of thin air or misusing real evidence that was introduced at trial, both forms 
of argument are prejudicial and improper.  
G. Misstating the Law 
Applying the law to the facts of the case is proper argument; misstating 
the law when doing so, however, is not. Prosecutors have misstated nearly 
every imaginable legal standard, including the law of affirmative 
defenses
100
 and of lesser-included crimes.
101
 But the height of sophistry can 
be found in prosecutors’ misstatements of the burden of proof.  
Prosecutors commonly attempt to lower the government’s burden of 
proof, thus raising the odds of winning a conviction. For example, one 
Washington prosecutor argued that the jury’s duty in reaching its verdict 
was to “search for the truth.”
102
 The appellate court, however, rightly stated 
that this argument “misstates the jury’s duty and sweeps aside the State’s 
burden.”
103
 Or, as one federal court explained, “‘seeking the truth’ suggests 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. (emphasis added).  
 95. State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 243 (Conn. 2002).  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. (emphasis added).  
 98. See FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 99. United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993).  
 100. See, e.g., State v. Bougneit, 294 N.W.2d 675 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). 
 101. See, e.g., State v. Neuser, 528 N.W.2d 49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 102. State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 103. Id.  
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determining whose version of events is more likely true, the government’s 




Similarly, a California prosecutor argued that the reasonable doubt 
standard is one “you use every day in your lives when you make important 
decisions, [including] decisions about whether you want to get married.”
105
 
The appellate court, however, held that such a statement “trivializes the 
reasonable doubt standard.”
106
 Further, the “marriage example is also 
misleading since the decision to marry is often based on a standard far less 
than reasonable doubt, as reflected in statistics indicating 33 to 60 percent 
of all marriages end in divorce.”
107
 
To make matters worse, these misstatements of law are sometimes 
incorporated into the trial judge’s instruction to the jury on reasonable 
doubt. In Wisconsin, for example, the often-challenged pattern jury 
instruction uses both the analogy to decision-making in the “important 
affairs of life”
108
 and, worse yet, literally instructs the jury “not to search for 
doubt” but instead to “search for the truth.”
109
 Regardless of whether the 
prosecutor’s argument parrots the trial judge’s instruction, however, 
arguments that falsely attempt to lower the burden of proof are still 
improper. Returning to the previous examples from Washington, the 
appellate court found the prosecutor’s argument to “search for the truth” 
improper despite the court’s pattern jury instruction equating beyond a 
reasonable doubt with “an abiding belief in the truth of the charge.”
110
 
Similarly, in California, the appellate court found the prosecutor’s argument 
“equat[ing] proof beyond a reasonable doubt to everyday decision-making 




                                                                                                             
 104. United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis 
added). 
 105. People v. Nguyen, 40 Cal. App. 4th 28, 35 (1995).  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. WIS. J.I. CRIM. 140 (2016). 
 109. Id. (emphasis added); see also Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or 
Doubt? An Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139 (2016) 
(demonstrating empirically that Wisconsin’s pattern jury instruction on the burden of proof 
lowers the burden below the reasonable doubt standard and is the equivalent of giving no 
burden of proof instruction whatsoever).  
 110. Cicchini & White, supra note 109, at 1147 n.34 (quoting State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 
245, 261 (Wash. 1995)). 
 111. People v. Johnson, 119 Cal. App. 4th 976, 980 (2004).  
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Prosecutors also seek to diminish the burden of proof by presenting the 
jury with a false dichotomy: in order to find the defendant not guilty, you 
“would have to find that [the state’s witnesses] are lying about the evidence 
they presented to you . . . . It’s really that black and white.”
112
 Of course, 
such arguments suffer from two fatal flaws. First, “testimony may be in 
direct conflict for reasons other than a witness’ intent to deceive,” the most 
obvious of which, of course, is that a witness may merely be mistaken.
113
 
And second, such prosecutorial arguments actually sidestep the burden of 
proof itself: 
[I]t of course does not follow as a matter of law that in order to 
acquit [the defendant] the jury had to believe that the agents had 
lied. If the jurors believed that the agents probably were telling 
the truth and that [the defendant] probably was lying . . . it would 
have been proper to return a verdict of not guilty because the 
evidence might not be sufficient to convict defendant beyond a 
reasonable doubt. To tell the jurors that they had to choose 
between the two stories was error.
114
 
 In other cases, instead of merely lowering the burden of proof, 
prosecutors often try shifting it to the defendant—regardless of whether the 
defendant presented evidence at trial. Just as prosecutors can spin a 
defendant’s decision to testify or to remain silent into evidence of guilt,
115
 
so too can they spin the defendant’s entire defense. When the defendant 
decides not to present any evidence and instead attacks the strength of the 
government’s case, prosecutors have shifted the burden by asking the jury, 
“How many witnesses did the defense put on for your consideration?”
116
 
Conversely, when the defendant decides to call witnesses, prosecutors have 
shifted the burden by improperly arguing that “the defendant has the same 




Finally, another prosecutorial twist simply asks the jury to dispense with 
the burden of proof altogether, arguing that the “burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a shield for the innocent . . . not a barrier to conviction 
                                                                                                             
 112. United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2000).  
 113. State v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226, 238 (Conn. 2002). 
 114. United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).  
 115. See supra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 116. Adams v. State, 566 S.W.2d 387 (Ark. 1978). 
 117. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1997).  
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 Therefore, the argument continues, because the jury 
“knows” the defendant is guilty, it should automatically convict, even when 
the prosecutor is, technically, unable to prove it.
119
 
H. Straw Men 
When a prosecutor sets up a straw man, he or she makes an argument, 
attributes that argument to defense counsel, and then demonstrates that the 
argument is invalid. Thus, the prosecutor gives the impression that, because 
he or she clearly won the debate, the jury should convict. The point that 
often eludes the jury, however, is that the prosecutor was merely arguing 
with him or herself.  
A common version of a straw man argument tracks closely with the false 
dichotomy prosecutors use to diminish the burden of proof. For example, 
when a defendant argues that a police officer was mistaken in his or her 
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, prosecutors will often 
distort the argument: 
While defense attorneys try and say, well, we’re not saying the 
police are lying; what else are they saying? There’s no other 
reasonable explanation, and it kind of frustrates me knowing and 
working in this field and knowing these officers; and you know 
them now too. You know them. They work hard. They do a 
tough job. They come in here to testify a lot of times. They work 




Fortunately, the appellate court saw through this argument: “[W]e cannot 
ignore the prosecutor’s self-imposed frustration at his own . . . suggestion 
that testifying police officers may have lied.”
121
 That is, defense counsel 
never once suggested the officers were lying; rather, the prosecutor merely 
created a straw man. But “[o]nce the prosecutor’s rhetorical straw man was 
created . . . it had to be eliminated.”
122
 And the prosecutor eliminated it by 
                                                                                                             
 118. Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 351 (2nd Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).  
 119. This argument is especially compelling, but just as improper, in states like 
Wisconsin where judges amazingly instruct juries “not to search for doubt” but instead “to 
search for the truth.” WIS. J.I. CRIM. 140 (2016). 
 120. State v. Smith, 2003 WI App 234, ¶ 12, 268 Wis. 2d 138, 671 N.W.2d 854 
(emphasis added). 
 121. Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
 122. Id.  
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referencing matters “not in the record” and by vouching “for the credibility 
of the police witnesses”—both of which “prejudiced” the defendant.
123
  
When straw man arguments are made in the prosecutor’s first argument 
to the jury, it is possible—though time consuming—for defense counsel to 
simply expose this sophistry in his or her own closing argument. But when 
the prosecutor sandbags defense counsel by making this improper argument 
in rebuttal, then the trial judge may have to be called upon to cure the 
prejudice. 
I. Sweet Emotion 
A prosecutor is not permitted to ask the jury to convict the defendant for 
any reason other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, 
prosecutors often resort to improper emotional appeals to win convictions. 
The countless examples of this type of prosecutorial misconduct make it 
impossible to catalog them all here. There are, however, three types of 
emotional arguments commonly made by prosecutors: invoking sympathy 
for the alleged victim, instilling fear of the consequences for failing to 
convict, and pandering to jurors’ biases and prejudices. 
With regard to sympathy-based arguments, prosecutors often attempt to 
win a conviction by pitting the alleged victim against the defendant. In one 
case, “at the conclusion of the prosecutor’s closing argument, he urged the 
jury to ‘show [the defendant] the same mercy shown to the victim on the 
day of her death.’”
124
 In other cases, prosecutors will whip up even more 
emotion by asking the jurors to step into the shoes of the alleged victim. For 
example, one “prosecutor made an objectionable ‘golden rule’ argument 
stating, ‘It’s a gun. It’s a real gun. It’s a gun with a laser on it. Just imagine 
how terrifying this laser would be if it was on your chest?’”
125
  
Equally dangerous is the prosecutorial argument that invokes fear in the 
context of societal issues. That is, prosecutors often urge jurors to convict 
because of what will happen to society if they acquit. For example, one 
prosecutor urged the jury to convict the defendant of a drug crime not based 
on evidence, but because “[d]rugs are corrupting our society. Drugs are 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id. at 860. 
 124. Tobin, supra note 12, at 501 (quoting Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 
1989)). 
 125. Montz, supra note 77, at 304 (quoting DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 601 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).  
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As the previous example demonstrated, children are an especially useful 
tool for invoking fear in the jury. Another prosecutor argued that the jury 
should convict not because there was evidence the defendant committed the 
child-sex crime with which he was charged, but rather to prevent 
hypothetical, future crimes: “I don’t know how many more small children 
we are going to allow him to . . . .”
127
 Hitting even closer to home, another 
prosecutor urged jurors to convict a defendant in order to “send ‘a message 
to those folks’ who might want to molest [your] neighbors’ children, [your] 
own children or grandchildren.”
128
 
Despite the effectiveness of using children to instill fear in a jury, 
perhaps the most effective way to invoke fear is to argue that the jurors will 
personally be put in harm’s way if they acquit the defendant. In a not-so-
subtle example of this argument, one prosecutor told the jurors “that gun is 
still out there. If you say not guilty, [the defendant] walks right out the 
door, right behind you.”
129
  
Finally, in addition to invoking sympathy and fear, prosecutors may also 
improperly rely on deeply ingrained racial and class biases to win 
convictions. For example, one prosecutor argued that a jury should convict 
a Jamaican defendant because “what is happening . . . is that Jamaicans are 
coming in, they’re taking over the retail sale of crack . . . . It’s a lucrative 
trade. The money, the crack, the cocaine that is coming into the city is 
being taken over by people just like [the defendant].”
130
 And, biases can run 
in both directions. Another prosecutor improperly argued that, if the jury 
failed to convict the defendant, “she was rich and would thumb her nose at 




                                                                                                             
 126. Anthony Flores, You Can’t Say That, or Maybe You Can: An Analysis of Michigan 
Prosecutor Closing Argument Law, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 273, 280 (2010) 
(paraphrasing People v. Duncan, 260 N.W.2d 58, 62-63 n.6 (Mich. 1977)).  
 127. Magar v. State, 836 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Ark. App. 1992) (upholding denial of mistrial 
request where defense counsel’s objection terminated the improper argument and trial judge 
issued curative instruction).  
 128. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 244-45 (quoting King v. State, 877 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Ark. 
1994)). 
 129. N. Mar. I. v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). 
 130. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 131. Tobin, supra note 12, at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ryan v. 
State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).  
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J. Uninvited Response  
Prosecutors often commit misconduct in their rebuttal closing, theorizing 
that their improper arguments were invited by defense counsel and are 
therefore justified. This “invited response” doctrine is grossly 
misunderstood and frequently abused. First, in order for a prosecutor’s 
otherwise improper argument to have any chance of finding safe haven as 
an invited response, defense counsel must first have made his or her own 
improper argument.
132
 Consider an example where, through cross-
examination at trial, defense counsel established that the police never 
questioned an eyewitness at the crime scene. Further, counsel established 
that the police never tested the physical evidence that was collected from 
the crime scene. Then, in closing argument, counsel argued that the police 
conducted a shoddy investigation, the state’s evidence cannot be trusted, 
and the evidence that was presented does not constitute proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
This is a proper defense argument.
133
 And while such an argument 
certainly “invites” the prosecutor to respond by citing any trial evidence 
that pointed to guilt, the prosecutor may not invoke the so-called (and 




Continuing with the above example, assuming there was no supporting 
testimony at trial, the prosecutor may not argue to the jury (whether true or 
not) that the police did not talk to the eyewitness because he or she was 
afraid of the defendant and refused to cooperate. Similarly, the prosecutor 
may not argue that the police did not send the physical evidence for testing 
due to a six-month backlog at the crime lab. Such arguments invoke facts 
not in evidence, are improper, and were certainly not invited by defense 
                                                                                                             
 132. See Bowman, supra note 2, at 372 (noting that the invited response doctrine is 
applicable only “[i]f the prosecutor’s misconduct was provoked by defense counsel’s own 
improper argument”) (citation omitted); Lyon, supra note 1, at 700 (“The prosecution may 
not . . . invoke the doctrine in an ‘offensive’ fashion; that is, it cannot use invited response as 
a springboard.”).  
 133. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 (1995) (“A common trial tactic of defense 
lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the 
defendant.” (quoting Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986)).  
 134. See United States v. Severson, 3 F.3d 1005, 1014 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that 
defense counsel’s argument that the witness was lying to get the benefit of his plea bargain 
did not invite the prosecutor’s response that the witness was testifying truthfully because 
“the government would not tolerate untruthful testimony”). 
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counsel’s proper arguments that the evidence failed to establish proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Second, even in cases where defense counsel does first make an 
improper argument, some jurisdictions hold that the prosecutor is not 
allowed to hide in the weeds, say nothing, and then launch into his or her 
own improper argument in rebuttal. Rather, the prosecutor may be required 
to object to defense counsel’s improper argument and seek a curative 
instruction from the court.
135
 And this makes sense: just as defense 
counsel’s failure to object to improper argument generally waives the issue 
of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, so too should the prosecutor’s 
failure to object waive the issue of defense counsel’s improper argument for 
purposes of invited response.  
Third, even when the invited response doctrine does excuse a 
prosecutor’s improper argument, the doctrine still has its limits. The 
prosecutor’s argument must have been “a necessary and reasonable” 
response to defense counsel’s improper argument.
136
 Further, prosecutor 
rebuttal arguments that implicate constitutional rights—such as a comment 
on the defendant’s right to remain silent at trial—are even less likely to be 
justified as an invited response.
137
  
Finally, even when the prosecutor makes otherwise proper arguments in 
rebuttal, it is important to remember that the purpose of rebuttal is to 
“respond to arguments of opposing counsel.”
138
 Just because defense 
counsel argued that the state did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the prosecutor should not have license to cite matters not raised by defense 
counsel merely because those matters point to the defendant’s guilt. If the 
word “rebuttal” could be interpreted that broadly, it would lose all meaning. 
Rather, the scope of rebuttal argument should be much narrower: “rebuttal 
shall be limited to matters raised by any adverse party in argument.”
139
 
                                                                                                             
 135. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (holding that the prosecutor’s 
argument was not justified by invited response doctrine as “the prosecutor at the close of 
defense summation should have objected to the defense counsel’s improper statements with 
a request that the court give a timely warning and curative instruction to the jury”).  
 136. William Timothy Allen, III, Comment, The Paradox of the Prosecutor: Justice 
Versus Conviction During Closing Argument, 34 LA. L. REV. 746, 758 (1974) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Bowman, supra note 2, at 320.  
 139. WIS. STAT. § 805.10 (2017). 
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Consequently, any rebuttal that goes beyond the specific arguments or facts 
raised by defense counsel should be considered improper sandbagging.
140
 
III. The Reactionary Approach 
Having identified several categories and examples of improper argument, 
the next question is: What does the criminal defense lawyer do about it? 
Following the conventional approach, most lawyers simply wait until the 
prosecutor commits the misconduct and then react to it. Under this 
approach, defense counsel must “contemporaneously object” to the 
misconduct, which then “gives the trial court the first opportunity to correct 
potential injustice by invoking an immediate cure and forestalling future 
harm.”
141
 Most jurisdictions follow the “fundamental rule” that relief “will 
not be considered in the absence of an appropriate objection in the trial 
court.”
142
 Unfortunately, objecting to prosecutorial misconduct, while a 
necessary step under the conventional approach, can be difficult and risky. 
And once the defense lawyer objects, the objection, by itself, is rarely 
sufficient. 
A. The Decision to Object 
To begin, even if defense counsel goes into a jury trial familiar with most 
types of improper argument, objecting in the heat of battle is not easy. 
When under the stress of the situation, it is often “difficult for defense 
counsel to quickly identify the problem and raise an objection in seconds at 
trial. Even if defense counsel is troubled by the prosecutor’s comments, 




Even if the defense lawyer quickly identifies an improper argument and 
is capable of articulating the appropriate objection, this does not necessarily 
mean that he or she should object. “Deciding whether to object during 
closing argument is one of the most difficult strategic decisions counsel 
faces during trial.”
144
 Objecting can be costly. 
                                                                                                             
 140. See, e.g., Grassmyer v. State, 429 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. 1981) (holding that a prosecutor 
may argue in “greater detail” about a topic raised by defense counsel, but that sandbagging is 
not proper). 
 141. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1013 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 142. Wicks v. State, 606 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Ark. 1980). 
 143. Bowman, supra note 2, at 356 (footnote omitted). 
 144. R. GEORGE BURNETT ET AL., WISCONSIN TRIAL PRACTICE § 9.64 (2001).  
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[T]he conventional wisdom within the field of trial advocacy is 
that attorneys should not object during closing arguments unless 
things are terrible. . . . [C]ounsel may be concerned about 
irritating the judge or jury by interrupting opposing counsel, 
which can heighten jurors’ general tendencies to favor 
prosecutors over defense counsel. More specifically, defense 
counsel may be concerned about the jury’s likely reaction if her 
objection is overruled. A trial court decision to overrule an 




Further, trial judges typically overrule objections, often because they do not 
know the law or may not even be listening to the arguments. And while it 
would be logical for defense counsel to think that his or her job is done 
when an objection is overruled, the defense lawyer may actually be on the 
hook for the trial judge’s error. 
In one case, for example, even though the trial court overruled defense 
counsel’s objection to improper argument, an appellate court “summarily 
dismissed the defendant’s appeal, holding that the issue was waived 
because defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial.”
146
 Of course, the 
appellate court did not say how the trial judge could have granted a mistrial 
(or awarded any other remedy) after overruling the underlying objection. 
Fortunately, many jurisdictions follow the far more rational approach that, 
“[i]f the trial court overrules the objection, no further step should be 
required of defense counsel . . . because the trial court has [already] ruled 
that no misconduct has occurred.”
147
 
In other cases—particularly where the trial judge does not understand the 
law or was not listening to the arguments—the judge may refuse to sustain 
or overrule defense counsel’s objection. Instead, he or she may simply utter 
                                                                                                             
 145. Bowman, supra note 2, at 358 (footnote omitted) (internal quotations omitted). The 
defense lawyer’s concern about drawing further attention to objectionable information is 
legitimate and supported by empirical evidence. See Shari S. Diamond et al., The “Kettleful 
of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1537, 1592 (2012) (discussing and citing an empirical study on the effect of an 
overruled objection).  
 146. Cicchini, supra note 26, at 355 (footnote omitted).  
 147. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 256; see also State v. Cockrell, 741 N.W.2d 267, 274, n. 
14 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]hen the court sustains the objection, without a request for a 
mistrial all [the court] can assume is that the defendant was satisfied with the court’s ruling 
and curative measure, and that he had no further objections. This rationale does not apply 
when the court has overruled the objection, as it did here.”) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
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a general-purpose platitude, such as, “I’m not going to talk about this. I’m 
going to let the jury decide this case on the instructions I’ve given you.”
148
 
Similarly, the judge may utter the true but meaningless statement that 
closing arguments “are not the evidence.”
149
 
And just as defense lawyers may be on the hook when the trial judge 
erroneously overrules an objection, so too can defense counsel be blamed 
when the trial judge neglects to formally rule on the objection and instead 
skirts the issue with platitudes and truisms. One appellate court held that 
because the defense lawyer “did not pursue the matter and thus failed to get 
a ruling on his objection . . . [h]e may not now pursue the matter on 
appeal.”
150
 Of course, the appellate court did not explain how the defense 
lawyer would have been able to demand—in the middle of arguments and 
in front of the jury—that the judge do his or her job and rule on the 
objection. Fortunately, some jurisdictions again follow a more rational 
approach, finding that “[i]f there is no ruling [by the trial judge], counsel 
should consider the objection overruled.”
151
 
Worse yet, even winning the battle could mean losing the war when it 
comes to objecting to a prosecutor’s closing argument: “[T]he defense 
attorney’s [objection], even if sustained by the court, may have exactly the 
opposite effect from the one intended. It may call attention to the 




B. The Problem of Remedies 
Even in the case where everything goes right—that is, defense counsel 
recognizes the improper argument and quickly objects, and the judge 
sustains the objection—the defense lawyer’s job has just begun. “[I]f trial 
counsel fails to move for additional relief, the action of the trial court in 
sustaining the objection will result in counsel obtaining all relief 
requested.”
153
 However, a sustained objection, by itself, usually will not be 
sufficient relief. At best, it may terminate the improper argument before the 
                                                                                                             
 148. Dunlap v. State, 728 S.W.2d 155, 162 (Ark. 1987). 
 149. Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 849 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that generic instruction 
that arguments “are not the evidence” was insufficient, as it did not “identify the 
prosecutor’s remarks as improper statements that should be disregarded” and was not “given 
contemporaneously with, or immediately after, the prosecutor’s inappropriate comments”). 
 150. Dunlap, 728 S.W.2d at 162. 
 151. BURNETT ET AL., supra note 144, § 6.29.  
 152. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 649.  
 153. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 250-51. 
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jury feels its full impact.
154
 But a sustained objection does nothing more. It 
is not even clear how a jury would interpret the judge’s ruling of 
“sustained.” Is the prosecutor’s argument sustained? Or is the objection 
sustained? And if the objection is sustained, what is the jury to think or do? 
Given the inadequacy of a sustained objection, defense counsel must 
request an appropriate remedy. Curative instructions from the judge to the 
jury
155
 and mistrial declarations
156
 represent the two most common 
remedies for improper arguments. Other possible remedies include 
permitting defense counsel to present a rebuttal argument or even reopening 
the case to permit rebuttal evidence. However, these alternatives are “not 
generally considered by trial judges”
157
 and are therefore not addressed in 
this Article.  
1. Curative Instructions 
For many types of improper arguments, a curative instruction is 
potentially helpful. For example, assume a prosecutor misstates the burden 
of proof by arguing that, because the state’s evidence is more believable 
than the defendant’s, the jury must convict. In this case, a curative 
instruction from the court may eliminate any prejudice. Such an instruction 
could remind jurors that the burden of proof is not the preponderance of 
evidence, and that “[i]f the jury has a reasonable doubt, then it must find the 
defendant not guilty even if it thinks that the charge is probably true.”
158
 
However, even assuming the trial judge was paying attention to the 
prosecutor’s argument and is also well-educated on the law, devising an 
effective curative instruction on the spot in the middle of closing arguments 
is not an easy task. Thus, when trial judges sustain objections, they 
                                                                                                             
 154. See Hepp, 831 F.3d at 849.  
 155. See, e.g., State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718 N.W.2d 269 
(upholding conviction because the trial judge “issued a curative instruction to the jury” after 
the prosecutor’s improper argument).  
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1016 (1st Cir. 1997) (vacating 
conviction for trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial). 
 157. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 252-53 (arguing that because a mistrial often places a high 
burden on the defendant rather than on the offending prosecutor, the trial court should 
consider “a range of corrective measures” including allowing defense counsel to present 
rebuttal evidence or argument).  
 158. VT. MODEL CRIM. J.I., at CR04-101 (2005) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Giroux, 
531 A.2d 403, 406 (Vt. 1989)). 
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typically resort to the generic mantra that “the words of the attorneys . . . 
are not evidence and must not be considered by you as evidence.”
159
  
 But this type of curative instruction doesn’t actually cure anything. 
Rather, there are at least three problems with it. First, the instruction lumps 
both attorneys together, even though it was the prosecutor, not the defense 
lawyer, who committed the misconduct. Second, the instruction does 
nothing to “identify the prosecutor’s remarks as improper statements that 
should be disregarded.”
160
 And third, telling the jury that arguments are not 
evidence completely misses the point because “[t]he issue was not the 




Even a good curative instruction is not always sufficient; some types of 
improper argument “may be too clearly prejudicial” for even a well-crafted 
“curative instruction to mitigate their effect.”
162
 For example, when a 
prosecutor argues, directly or indirectly, that the defendant’s failure to 
testify is evidence of guilt, any curative instruction would “likely serve[] to 
emphasize” the improper argument rather than mitigate it.
163
 Similarly, 
when the prosecutor inflames the jury’s passions by arguing that, if they fail 
to convict, the defendant could victimize them or their families,
164
 even the 
best curative instruction cannot un-ring the bell.  
2. Mistrial 
In cases where a curative instruction is of little or no value, defense 
counsel can alternatively request a mistrial. But “[w]hether to grant a 
mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
165
 One mistrial 
framework, for example, requires the trial judge to assess the impact of the 
prosecutor’s improper argument on the trial as a whole by weighing the 
following factors: 
                                                                                                             
 159. Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 849 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that this generic 
instruction was not sufficient to cure the prejudice). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Cicchini, supra note 26, at 352. 
 162. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644 (1974).  
 163. State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 592 (Tenn. 2014) (holding improper argument 
not curable with an instruction). 
 164. See, e.g., N. Mar. I. v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
prejudicial error based on the prosecutor’s argument that “[T]hat gun is still out there. If you 
say not guilty, he walks right out the door, right behind you”).  
 165. State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, ¶ 24, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 674 N.W.2d 894.  
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1) the nature and seriousness of the prosecutorial misconduct; 2) 
whether the prosecutor’s statements were invited by conduct of 
defense counsel; 3) whether the trial court[’s curative] 
instructions to the jury were adequate; 4) whether the defense 
was able to counter the improper arguments through rebuttal; 
and 5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant.
166
 
Under this particular test, the case for a mistrial will be strongest when, in a 
relatively close trial, the prosecutor repeatedly made improper arguments, 
particularly if they infringed constitutional rights such as due process, the 
right against self-incrimination, or the right of confrontation. The case for a 
mistrial will be strengthened if the prosecutor committed the misconduct in 
rebuttal, particularly when the arguments were not invited by any improper 
argument made by the defense counsel. The case will be strengthened even 
further when the impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct cannot be mitigated 
by a curative instruction or when the judge gives an instruction not 
sufficiently tailored to the misconduct.  
But even when a mistrial is granted, the typical prosecutor will simply 
retry the defendant, often with a battle-tested and stronger case the second 
time around. Whether a prosecutor can retry the defendant relies on a 
common, if bizarre, test: 
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
defendants’ double jeopardy protections only extend to cases 
where the prosecutor’s misconduct was committed “in order to 
goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.” . . . 
 Under Kennedy, therefore, if the prosecutor merely intended 
to harass the defendant, overreach, or obtain a conviction by 
improper means, the prosecutor is rewarded by being able to 




                                                                                                             
 166. United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Sigarroa, 674 
N.W.2d at 903 (“The trial court must determine, in light of the whole proceeding, whether 
the claimed error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.”). 
 167. Cicchini, supra note 26, at 357 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673-75 
(1982)). Some states may employ a differently worded, more favorable legal standard. See, 
e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“Did the prosecutor 
engage in that conduct with the intent to goad the defendant into requesting a mistrial 
(Kennedy standard) or with conscious disregard for a substantial risk that the trial court 
would be required to declare a mistrial (Bauder standard)?”); State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 
114, 122 (Wis. 1980) (“[I]f a defendant’s motion for mistrial is prompted by prosecutorial or 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/4
2018]       MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS 919 
 
 
This test presents a problem for defendants because it is nearly impossible 
to satisfy,
168
 which often has the perverse effect of encouraging, rather than 
deterring, improper arguments. As a result, when prosecutors commit 
misconduct in closing argument and a mistrial is granted, they are nearly 
always rewarded with a do-over.
169
  
Further, a retrial could be incredibly costly for a defendant in terms of 
time, money, or both. When a defendant is paying for defense counsel’s 
fees (as opposed to being represented by a public defender), the costs of a 
second trial can be staggering and financially ruinous. When a defendant is 
indigent and unable to post bail, he or she will likely remain in custody 
pending the retrial, the practical result of which is that, in many cases, the 
defendant essentially serves the sentence for the crime, even when the state 
fails to win an actual conviction.
170
 
For these reasons, a defendant might not want a mistrial, instead 
preferring “to proceed with resolution of the case by the empaneled jury 
rather than starting over with a new jury.”
171
 In other words, although a 
“[m]istrial is the only remedy certain to ensure that the prejudicial conduct 




To make matters even more complicated, courts vary as to when and 
how defense counsel must request a mistrial. For example, at least one court 
seems to require counsel to request a mistrial first, even though, if granted, 
such a remedy could carry serious consequences for the defendant. Then, 
“upon denial of mistrial, counsel may properly request an admonition to the 
                                                                                                             
judicial misconduct which was intended ‘to provoke’ defendant’s motion or was otherwise 
‘motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice’ the defendant or to ‘afford the 
prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict’ the defendant, double jeopardy does 
bar further prosecution.”).  
 168. See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 688 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is almost 
inconceivable that a defendant could prove that the prosecutor’s deliberate misconduct was 
motivated by an intent to provoke a mistrial instead of an intent simply to prejudice the 
defendant.”) (footnote omitted). 
 169. See Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: 
Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 894-95 (1998). 
 170. Ironically, one judge believes that, even though it was the government’s 
misconduct, not defense counsel’s, that caused the problem to begin with, appellate courts 
are justified in their “unwillingness to impose on society the added expense of money and 
resources involved in a retrial.” See Celebrezze, supra note 21, at 244-45.  
 171. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 252. 
 172. Id.  
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 And if counsel first requests an admonition to the jury, he or she 
may be waiving the right to request a mistrial at a later time.
174
  
The more rational approach is to allow defense counsel to begin with less 
extreme requests, such as a request for a curative instruction. Then, after 
consultation with the client, and after considering the cumulative impact on 
cases with multiple instances of improper argument, defense counsel may 
additionally move for a mistrial before the jury returns its judgment.
175
 If 
counsel fails to do so, then the court will assume that he or she “was 
satisfied with the court’s ruling and curative measure.”
176
 
C. The Risk of Not Objecting 
As demonstrated above, the law governing objections, rulings, and 
remedies is chaotic. Even under the best conditions, objecting to 
prosecutorial misconduct can be meaningless, if not harmful, for the 
defense. However, the risks of not objecting may be even greater. 
To demonstrate this, assume that a prosecutor makes an improper closing 
argument. To avoid drawing further attention to the argument, and to avoid 
the risk that the judge will overrule an objection, defense counsel makes a 
snap decision not to object. In this case, the defendant probably “waives the 
right to appeal on that specific point because the trial judge [did] not have 




More specifically, when the defendant’s appellate lawyer later complains 
of the improper argument, he or she will set in motion a rather bizarre legal 
standard. Despite the prosecutor’s duty as a so-called “minister of 
justice,”
178
 the improper argument will no longer be analyzed as 
prosecutorial misconduct. Instead, all blame for the prosecutor’s unethical 




                                                                                                             
 173. Id. at 255. 
 174. Id.  
 175. See State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718 N.W.2d 269. 
 176. Id. at 278; see also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 228 (“The trial court sustained defense 
counsel’s objection and admonished the jury to disregard the statements, and the court of 
appeals noted that defense counsel had failed to request a stronger admonition or other 
relief.”).  
 177. Flores, supra note 126, at 279. 
 178. See supra Part I. 
 179. See Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 848 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In Jordan’s trial, [defense 
counsel] failed to object to any of the prosecutor’s improper statements. Our first question is 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/4
2018]       MISCONDUCT IN CLOSING ARGUMENTS 921 
 
 
This is bad news for both the defense lawyer and the defendant. First, 
and rather perversely, it is the defense lawyer who will be held to answer 
for the prosecutor’s intentional misconduct.
180
 As such, defense counsel 
will have to explain his or her thought process behind the snap judgment 
not to object to the improper argument.
181
 Often, this explanation must be 
given months or even years after the trial—long after defense counsel’s 
memory of the prosecutor’s misconduct has faded.  
Second, if defense counsel remembers his or her thought process behind 
the decision not to object, the court will deem nearly any explanation to 
have been a reasonable trial strategy, and the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim will fail.
182
 Conversely, if the defense lawyer cannot 
remember the incident, and therefore cannot testify about the split-second 
decision he or she made months or even years earlier, any error will likely 
be deemed harmless.
183
 Either way, the probable result is the same: the 
defendant loses and obtains no relief for the prosecutor’s unethical 
behavior. 
The news only gets worse from there for the defendant. In cases where 
defense counsel decided not to object to the improper argument, the 
defendant’s appellate lawyer may also choose to pursue an “interest of 
justice,” “fundamental error,” or “plain error” type of argument when 
challenging the prosecutor’s misconduct. One author framed the test this 
way: “Without a proper and timely objection . . . reversal on appeal will 
only occur if . . . the outcome at trial would have seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.”
184
 But this 
conception doesn’t adequately describe the near impossibility of succeeding 
under this legal standard, as many courts add an additional hurdle to plain 
                                                                                                             
whether that failure rendered [defense counsel’s] performance ineffective under 
Strickland.”).  
 180. See DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“[D]efense 
counsel has the duty to remain alert to [improper argument] in fulfilling his responsibility to 
see that his client receives a fair trial. . . . [T]his court is not inclined to excuse counsel for 
his failure in this regard.”).  
 181. See Jordan, 831 F.3d at 850 (“We instruct the district court to hold a hearing . . . to 
allow the parties to present evidence about whether [defense counsel] had a strategic reason 
for failing to object the prosecution’s improper vouching . . . .”). 
 182. See State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶ 63, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115, 131 (Wis. 
2007) (“Defense counsel’s lack of objections on [numerous improper arguments] was found 
by the circuit court to involve defense strategy, which this court will not now second-
guess.”).  
 183. See id. at 130.  
 184. Flores, supra note 126, at 283. 
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error review. When the defense lawyer “fail[s] to object to the remarks 
when they were made, the plain error standard additionally requires that 
[the defendant] ‘establish not only that the remarks denied him a fair trial, 




And yet, other appellate courts seem to imply that even unfairness 
combined with harm is not enough. Because these courts are highly tolerant 
of prosecutorial misconduct, “[p]lain error review is ordinarily limited to 
‘blockbusters’ and does not ‘consider the ordinary backfires—whether or 
not harmful to a litigant’s cause—which may mar a trial record.’”
186
 And, 
if we have learned anything thus far, it is that improper argument is so 
common that it is “ordinary.” Courts, therefore, nearly always reject plain 
error challenges.
187
 The result, once again, is that the defendant obtains no 
relief for the prosecutor’s misconduct.  
IV. A Simple Plan 
As demonstrated above, reacting to prosecutorial misconduct after the 
fact via a contemporaneous objection is often ineffective. Therefore, 
defense counsel should consider formulating a plan for dealing with 
improper remarks long before the prosecutor utters them in closing 
argument.  
A. Plan Objectives 
Defense counsel’s plan for dealing with improper closing arguments 
should, ideally, accomplish several objectives. First, the plan should deter 
the prosecutor from making improper arguments in the first place by 
putting the prosecutor on the defensive. The plan should “have a chilling 
effect on closing argument rhetoric,” and should make the prosecutor 
“[f]earful of reprisal” for making improper arguments.
188
 
                                                                                                             
 185. United States v. Anderson, 303 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
 186. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1014 (1st Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).  
 187. See Mayo, 734 N.W.2d at 119 (Wis. 2007) (“[A]lthough there was improper 
prosecutorial argument . . . such misconduct did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to 
constitute a denial of [the defendant’s] due process rights, thus warranting a new trial, either 
as plain error or in the interest of justice.”); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 248 (discussing the 
near impossibility of obtaining relief under the “doctrine of fundamental error which would 
afford review of unpreserved error”).  
 188. Gagnon, supra note 8, at 485.  
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Second, in the event the prosecutor is not deterred, the plan should 
educate the trial judge by describing what the prosecutor is likely to argue 
and explaining why such argument is improper. This way, the trial judge is 
alert and engaged during closing arguments, making it more likely he or she 
will recognize an improper argument in the first place—a prerequisite if the 
defendant is to obtain any meaningful relief. 
Third, the plan should adequately preserve the prosecutor’s misconduct 
for meaningful judicial review during trial and, if necessary, at post-
conviction hearings and on appeal. Thus, the plan should prevent the 
shifting of blame from the prosecutor to defense counsel (via the ineffective 
assistance of counsel framework) and should prevent the courts from 
sidestepping the issue by applying the plain error framework, which, as 
noted above, is incredibly difficult to satisfy. Moreover, given the 
demanding and potentially harmful nature of the normally required 
contemporaneous objection, the plan should preserve the prosecutor’s 
misconduct for judicial review without defense counsel having to object in 
the middle of closing arguments.  
Fourth, the plan should provide defense counsel and the trial court with 
an opportunity to develop effective curative instructions for the prosecutor’s 
misconduct. Just as it is difficult for defense counsel to identify improper 
arguments and instantly formulate an objection in the heat of battle, so too 
is it difficult for even a well-educated and attentive trial judge to craft a 
meaningful curative instruction on the spot. 
Fifth, in the event that curative instructions are not sufficient to cure the 
prosecutor’s misconduct, the plan should give defense counsel the 
opportunity to consult with the defendant before requesting the serious and 
costly remedy of a mistrial. In cases with multiple improper arguments, it 
should also give the trial judge the opportunity to assess the cumulative 
impact of the misconduct before ruling on the mistrial motion.  
Finally, in the event a mistrial is requested and declared, the plan should 
lay a foundation for defense counsel to later argue that double jeopardy 
protections prevent the state from re-prosecuting the defendant in a second 
trial.  
B. Pretrial Motion in Limine 
In order to accomplish the above objectives, the battle must be won 
before it is fought—that is, before closing arguments begin. A motion in 
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limine, which is filed before trial and seeks an advanced ruling on an issue 
likely to arise during the trial, can accomplish this goal.
189
  
Motions in limine promote trial efficiency, and their use has expanded in 
recent years.
190
 Given the disruption caused at trial by prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing arguments and the dearth of suitable remedies once 
the misconduct occurs, the issue of “[i]mproper prosecutorial arguments” is 
undoubtedly “appropriate for a motion in limine.”
191
 More specifically, if 
defense counsel “suspect[s] that the prosecutor intends to make improper 
statements during closing argument, [defense counsel] should consider 
filing a motion in limine before [trial] asking the trial judge to preclude the 
prosecutor from making those arguments.”
192
 If this motion is granted, it 
could solve the biggest problem facing defense counsel at trial: in many 
jurisdictions, as long as “the motion alert[s] the trial court to the same issue 
of fact or law that arises at trial,” then “the motion in limine relieves the 
party from having to object.”
193
 
This makes sense, of course, as the very purpose of raising the issue 
before trial is to avoid having to object and draw more attention to the 
improper argument during trial.
194
 To require an objection at trial to 
something already raised in a motion in limine would put counsel “in a 
classic ‘Catch 22’ position. By not objecting, [counsel] is held to waiver. 
By objecting, [counsel] draws the jury’s attention to the very prejudicial 
[argument] that the trial court had already ruled [improper].”
195
 As one 
court stated, because the purpose “of the contemporaneous objection rule is 
fairness, we will not apply the rule to permit such an unfair dilemma.”
196
 
In jurisdictions where the motion in limine, if granted, serves as a legally 
valid substitute for the contemporaneous objection, this approach should 
also satisfy another objective: it preserves the prosecutor’s misconduct for 
meaningful review at all levels including during post-conviction hearings 
                                                                                                             
 189. See Celebrezze, supra note 21, at 245 (“[D]efense counsel could offer a motion in 
limine prior to closing argument if it is anticipated that the prosecutor is bent on making 
improper remarks.”).  
 190. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 2003 WI App 252, 268 Wis. 2d 694, 673 N.W.2d 386.  
 191. L. MICHAEL TOBIN, WISCONSIN CRIMINAL DEFENSE MANUAL ch. 5, at 156 (5th ed. 
2011) (citing numerous improper arguments and supporting case law).  
 192. 2 JULIE RAMSEUR LEWIS & JOHN RUBIN, NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL, 
TRIAL § 33.7(C) (2d ed. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 193. State v. Bergeron, 470 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). 
 194. See State v. English-Lancaster, 2002 WI App 74, ¶ 8, 252 Wis. 2d 388, 642 N.W.2d 
627. 
 195. Id. at 631. 
 196. Id. (citation omitted). 
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and on appeal. And the motion in limine will serve to focus the attention of 
post-conviction counsel and the courts on the prosecutor’s misconduct, 
rather than on the defense lawyer’s failure to properly react to the improper 
arguments. 
In order to accomplish the objectives related to remedies, however, the 
motion in limine must go beyond merely asking the court to order the 
prosecutor not to make certain types of improper arguments. Rather, the 
motion must assume the prosecutor will violate the court’s order and should 
therefore propose a course of action with regard to the two most common 
remedies: curative instructions and a mistrial.  
As previously discussed, many types of improper arguments can be 
adequately addressed by curative instructions. In order to allow sufficient 
time to draft instructions tailored to the specific prosecutorial offense, 
though, the motion should request a hearing for that purpose outside the 
jury’s presence. The hearing should be held after the prosecutor’s rebuttal 
argument and before the court issues its final instructions to the jury. Then, 
to allow defense counsel an opportunity to consult with the defendant 
before requesting a mistrial, the motion should preserve the right to request 
the mistrial until after the court’s final instructions to the jury and before 
the jury returns its verdict.  
Finally, in the event the court grants a mistrial motion, the previously 
filed motion in limine may also help accomplish the final objective 
discussed above: offering protection when the prosecutor attempts to retry 
the defendant. Although highly state specific, the test for whether the 
prosecutor may retry the defendant may hinge on whether the prosecutor 
goaded defense counsel into requesting the mistrial.
197
 If so, then retrial is 
barred. This high standard is a much easier to satisfy when defense counsel 
previously put the prosecutor on notice via the motion in limine that 
improper arguments would provoke a mistrial request.  
C. Trial Procedure 
After filing a motion in limine, defense counsel must also have a plan for 
the trial itself. This requires researching the applicable procedural laws 
including, for example, any timing requirements for requesting the 
available remedies. At a minimum, defense counsel should be prepared for 
the following three steps.  
  
                                                                                                             
 197. See supra Section III.B.2. 
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1. Decide Whether to Object 
In many jurisdictions, assuming the trial judge granted the motion in 
limine before trial and the prosecutor violated the court’s order by making 
an improper argument, no contemporaneous objection by defense counsel 
should be required. There are still several scenarios, however, where 
defense counsel will be required to object. First, when the trial judge denied 
the motion as being premature, refused to rule on the motion, or responded 
to the motion in a vague way—for example, by stating that the lawyers will 
be expected to follow the rules during closing arguments—defense counsel 
will be required to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct as it occurs. In this 
case, the motion in limine will have failed to fulfill one of its objectives: to 
relieve defense counsel of the duty to object in the middle of closing 
arguments. Simply filing the motion in limine, however, will still 
accomplish many other objectives. 
Second, even if the judge granted the motion in limine, defense counsel 
will still be held to the contemporaneous-objection rule when the prosecutor 
makes an improper argument that was not identified in the motion. This is 
so because the judge did not have the opportunity to order the prosecutor 
not to commit that particular brand of misconduct.
198
  
Third, even when defense counsel has identified a particular type of 
improper argument in the motion in limine and the judge granted the 
motion, counsel may still want to object in cases where the objection might 
terminate the argument before the prosecutor completes a full windup and 
delivery. Therefore, the motion in limine should preserve counsel’s right to 
object, even though the motion in limine relieves counsel of the obligation 
to object. 
2. Request a Post-argument Hearing 
Assume, then, that the prosecutor makes an improper argument to the 
jury, regardless of whether defense counsel (a) identified the issue in the 
motion in limine, which the court granted; or (b) contemporaneously 
objected at trial. The next step, after the state’s rebuttal argument, is to 
quickly request a conference to be held outside the jury’s presence and 
before the court gives its final instructions to the jury. At this conference, 
                                                                                                             
 198. This is, of course, absurd; imagine a defendant arguing that he should not be 
prosecuted for, say, theft, because no one ever specifically told him not to commit that 
particular crime. Nonetheless, this is why motions in limine should be worded broadly to 
foreclose categories of improper argument, rather than highly specific versions of such 
arguments. 
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defense counsel should identify the prosecutor’s improper argument and 
propose curative instructions to be included with the court’s final, pre-
deliberation instructions. Curative instructions will vary dramatically based 
on the prosecutor’s specific form of misconduct.
199
 
3. Consider a Mistrial Motion 
Once the jury receives its final instructions (including any curative 
instructions) and begins its deliberations, defense counsel must next discuss 
with the defendant the possibility of a motion for a mistrial. The “[m]istrial 
is the only remedy certain to ensure that the prejudicial conduct will not 
taint the ultimate verdict”; obtaining this remedy, however, “may unfairly 
burden the defendant.”
200
 During the discussion, defense counsel should 
explain the possibility—or likelihood—of retrial as well as other 
consequences including a lengthy delay, continued incarceration, additional 
attorney’s fees and other trial expenses, and, most significantly, the 
possibility of the state developing a stronger case for the second trial. 
Not requesting a mistrial, however, also has consequences that defense 
counsel should explain. Most significantly, the appellate court will likely 
decide that the defendant was happy with merely receiving a sustained 
objection and curative instruction, if any, and decided to roll the dice on the 
verdict. Counsel should be sure to explain that, in this scenario, the 
defendant’s post-conviction counsel may be forced to seek relief through 
the difficult-to-satisfy plain-error framework. 
Any mistrial motion should be tailored to the specific jurisdiction’s 
multi-factor mistrial test. Additionally, to support any future motion that the 
prosecutor should be barred from retrying the defendant, counsel may wish 
to state that: (1) the prosecutor was put on notice via the pretrial motion in 
limine—regardless of whether the court granted it—that a particular 
argument was improper and would provoke a mistrial request; (2) the 
prosecutor decided to make that improper argument despite such notice; 




D. Other Mistrial-Related Issues 
With regard to mistrial motions, two highly jurisdiction-specific issues 
arise that defense counsel should research, consider, and discuss with the 
                                                                                                             
 199. Sample curative instructions for many types of improper arguments are provided in 
Appendix B.  
 200. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 252 (emphasis added). 
 201. See supra Section III.B.2. 
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defendant before trial, and even before filing a motion in limine: who has 
the power to request a mistrial, and when must the court rule on a mistrial 
request? 
First, if the lawyer and the client disagree on whether to request a 
mistrial, with whom does the decision rest? Most attorneys, trial judges, and 
even appellate courts do not know the answer. In one case, a trial judge 
offered the defendant the opportunity for a mistrial, and “told him that 
while the decision was his, he should seriously consider his attorney’s 
advice.”
202
 After lengthy consultation with defense counsel, the defendant 
elected not to follow his attorney’s advice to request a mistrial and instead 
proceeded to verdict; the defendant was convicted.
203
  
On appeal, the defendant argued that this was a strategic decision that 
should have been left to counsel. Such a decision, the defendant argued, did 
not fall into the category of fundamental decisions that are reserved for the 
client, such as whether to enter a plea or go to trial and, if there is a trial, 
whether to testify.
204
 The court stated that it was “an intriguing and 
sophisticated” question as to whether defense counsel or the defendant 
“should be permitted to make a mistrial decision.”
205
 The court never truly 
disagreed with the defendant, thereby implying that the decision might 
actually rest with counsel, as the defendant had argued on appeal. The 
court, however, dispensed with the issue by employing the doctrines of 
“waiver” and “judicial estoppel.”
206
  
But even if the mistrial decision is, in theory, left to the lawyer, it is 
often—probably always—intertwined with decisions that are left to the 
defendant. For example, the defendant has the constitutional right to 
counsel of choice. But what if the defendant could not afford to pay his 
lawyer for a second trial and would instead have to obtain state- or court-
appointed counsel for the retrial? In that case, wouldn’t a mistrial request 
implicate a constitutional right? And shouldn’t the decision whether to ask 
for a mistrial be left to the defendant?  
Similarly, many defendants are unable to post bail and therefore must 
remain incarcerated during their cases—a key reason that a defendant has a 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. But what if, due to court congestion, 
unavailable witnesses, or some other reason, a mistrial would result in a 
long delay? In that case, wouldn’t a mistrial request implicate yet another 
                                                                                                             
 202. State v. Washington, 419 N.W.2d 275, 276 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).  
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 276-77. 
 205. Id. at 277. 
 206. Id.  
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constitutional right? And, once again, shouldn’t the decision whether to ask 
for a mistrial be left to the defendant?
207
 
For these situations, one appellate court offered valuable advice, which 
may prove useful for defense attorneys: “Faced with the dilemma of this 
disagreement between client and attorney, the trial court did the only 
prudent thing. It urged [the defendant] to follow the attorney’s advice, [and] 




Second, while defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial likely must be 
made before the jury returns its verdict (or sooner in some jurisdictions), 
when must the court rule on the motion? In some states “a trial court may 
declare a mistrial up to the point the jury’s verdict is accepted. A jury’s 
verdict is not accepted until it is received in open court, the results 
announced, the jury polled, if requested, and the judgment entered.”
209
 Such 
timing would be ideal for the defendant. If jury verdict is “not guilty,” 
defense counsel simply withdraws the mistrial motion and instead moves 
for judgment on the verdict. This timing removes the risks associated with 
asking for a mistrial.  
While this may seem like an unfair advantage for the defendant, it is 
actually the only fair way to proceed. After all, it was the prosecutor’s 
misconduct—not that of the defendant or defense counsel—that provoked 
the mistrial motion in the first place. Why should the prosecutor’s improper 
behavior force the defendant to choose between two unattractive 
alternatives: a tainted verdict or a costly retrial? Fairness and efficiency 
require that the jury be allowed to return its verdict before any 




The question then becomes whether defense counsel has any influence 
over the timing of the court’s ruling. Counsel may consider coupling a 
mistrial motion with the request that the court defer its ruling until after the 
                                                                                                             
 207. See State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 114, 123 (Wis. 1980) (discussing the defendant’s 
“‘valued right’ to secure a verdict from the first tribunal” rather than to request a mistrial). 
 208. Washington, 419 N.W.2d at 277 (emphasis added). 
 209. State v. Reid, 479 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added); see 
also Gainer v. Koewler, 546 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the trial 
judge “decided to take the motion under advisement” and deferred ruling until “[a]fter the 
verdict and at the postverdict hearings”). 
 210. Many thanks to attorney Thomas Aquino, a fellow member of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, for alerting me to the case of Gainer v. Koewler, 
the possibility of the trial judge taking a mistrial motion under advisement, and the potential 
strategy of asking the trial judge to do so. 
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jury returns its verdict, stressing the fairness- and efficiency-based 
arguments set forth above. Alternatively, counsel may wish to propose such 
timing in the motion in limine itself, thus obtaining an advance ruling on 
the issue. Such a ruling would, in turn, allow counsel to more freely request 
a mistrial as there would be no risk to the defendant in doing so.  
But would a trial court be less likely to grant a mistrial request after the 
jury returns a guilty verdict? And would an appellate court later turn 
defense counsel’s request for a deferred ruling against the defendant, 
finding that it somehow qualified or even negated the motion itself? After 
all, courts have demonstrated, beyond any doubt, that they will break clean 
through the boundaries of logic, reason, and fairness in order to affirm 
defendants’ convictions.  
Conclusion 
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is rampant. Unfortunately, 
defense lawyers’ conventional, reactionary approach to the problem is often 
ineffective and sometimes even exacerbates the harm. Rather than 
following this ineffective approach, exposing the defense to potentially 
damaging objections in front of the jury, defense counsel should utilize a 
preemptive motion in limine to combat improper arguments before they are 
ever made. Doing so may prevent the prosecutor from making improper 
arguments in the first place and will alert the trial judge to the likelihood of 
prosecutorial misconduct. Most importantly, in cases where a preemptive 
motion in limine is granted and subsequently violated, the order will 
establish a framework for addressing the misconduct in meaningful ways, 
including providing the opportunity to draft thoughtful and effective 
curative instructions, affording time for client consultation before 
requesting the more serious remedy of a mistrial, and, in the event a mistrial 
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APPENDIX A: MOTION IN LIMINE 
The following is a sample motion in limine. Defense counsel should 
tailor all motions in limine, and all in-court strategies, to the jurisdiction’s 
applicable substantive and procedural law and to the facts of the particular 
case. Further, counsel should ensure that all sources (below) are accurate, 
applicable, and have not been superseded by new law. 
If defense counsel believes a particular judge will not be receptive to this 
preemptive approach and lengthy motion in limine, counsel may still wish 
to file a much shorter motion without the introductory material, without 
seeking relief from the contemporaneous objection rule, and without 









DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
Notice of Motion 
[Date, time, and place of hearing] 
Motion 
The Defendant, appearing specially by [his / her] attorney and reserving 
the right to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, moves the Court for the entry 
of orders as requested and pursuant to the authorities below. 
Improper closing arguments by prosecutors have become the norm in 
criminal trials. For several reasons, “prosecutorial recidivism—the 
tendency of the same prosecutor or office to engage in misconduct 
                                                                                                             
 211. A shorter version might read as follows. “The defendant moves the Court for the 
entry of an order that, if the prosecutor makes an improper closing argument of any kind: (1) 
the words ‘objection, improper argument’ are sufficient to identify and preserve the issue for 
the Court’s review; (2) the Court will, upon a timely request by defense counsel, hold a 
hearing outside the jury’s presence before deliberations begin to discuss possible curative 
instructions; and (3) in addition to any curative instructions issued by the Court, the 
defendant may request a mistrial at any time before the jury returns its verdict.” Applicable 
legal authorities should also be included.  
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repeatedly, even in the face of admonishments from the [appellate] 
court”—is widespread. Paul J. Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in 
Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. App. Prac. 
& Process 115, 116 (1999). 
Although it is generally considered defense counsel’s responsibility to 
protect his or her client from a prosecutor’s misconduct in closing 
argument, there is also “an affirmative duty placed upon the trial court to 
object on its own motion.” Warshafsky & Crivello, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR 
WISCONSIN LAWYERS, § 34:09 (3d ed.).  
The problem, however, is that a prosecutor’s improper closing argument 
often poses difficulties for defense counsel and the trial court. On the one 
hand, objecting to improper argument is not only difficult to do in the heat 
of a jury trial, but “may serve only to repeat and attract attention to the 
improper remark, and thereby compound the prejudicial effect.” Id.  
On the other hand, though, not objecting fails to preserve the issue on its 
merits, often resulting in a time-consuming “ineffective assistance of 
counsel” hearing and, in some cases, an even more time-consuming second 
trial. See, e.g., State v. Weiss, 752 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) 
(reversing conviction due to prosecutor’s improper argument about facts 
not in evidence). 
In sum, prosecutors routinely make improper closing arguments because 
they are highly effective, difficult to counter, and rarely, if ever, punished. 
Therefore, “the bar and, particularly, the bench, should be aware of the 
phenomenon and take measures designed to increase the risks for those 
attorneys who persist in this strategy.” Gainer v. Koewler, 546 N.W.2d 
474, 478 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added) (discussing counsel’s 
improper closing argument and violation of pretrial orders).  
The defendant therefore seeks to address these matters preemptively to 
(1) deter the prosecutor from making improper arguments in the first place, 
(2) promote general trial efficiency, (3) avoid potentially counterproductive, 
harmful objections during closing arguments, (4) greatly reduce the 
likelihood of costly and time-consuming post-conviction hearings and a 
subsequent retrial, and (5) put the prosecutor on notice that improper 
argument will provoke a mistrial request by the defendant. 
Therefore:  
1. The defendant moves the Court to order the prosecutor not to engage 
in the forms of improper argument set forth below in motion in limine 
number five. 
2. The defendant moves the Court to order that, if the prosecutor engages 
in such forms of argument, the defendant’s objection is preserved 
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based on this motion in limine and without the need for a 
contemporaneous objection at trial. 
a. When defense counsel raises an issue in a pretrial motion in 
limine, to require an additional objection at trial would place 
defense counsel “in a classic Catch-22 position. By not 
objecting, [counsel] is held to waiver. By objecting, [counsel] 
draws the jury’s attention to the very [argument] that the trial 
court had already ruled [improper]. Recalling that one of the 
purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule is fairness, we 
will not apply the rule to permit such an unfair dilemma.” State 
v. English-Lancaster, 642 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
b. Therefore, when defense counsel moves in limine to preclude the 
prosecutor from making an improper argument at trial, and the 
court grants the motion, counsel is relieved “from having to 
object to the same issue of fact or law that arises at trial.” State v. 
Bergeron, 470 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).  
c. Finally, despite being relieved of the obligation to object, 
defense counsel still has the right to object to improper argument 
when doing so would be in the best interests of the defendant, for 
example, where an objection might terminate an improper 
argument before the jury is able to feel its full impact.  
3. The defendant moves the Court, if defense counsel so requests at the 
conclusion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, to hold a conference 
outside the jury’s presence and before it receives its final instructions 
from the Court. The purpose of the conference is to discuss remedies 
for any improper arguments made by the prosecutor, including but not 
limited to the remedy of curative instructions. 
a. Many instances of improper arguments—including, for example, 
arguments that misstate the burden of proof—can be adequately 
addressed by a curative instruction from the court. 
b. However, pattern instructions and generic curative instructions 
that merely state the obvious—for example, that “the words of 
the attorneys . . . are not evidence and must not be considered by 
you as evidence”—are not legally sufficient to cure the 
prejudicial impact of improper argument. Jordan v. Hepp, 831 
F.3d 837, 849 (7th Cir. 2016). 
c. Therefore, a post-argument, pre-jury deliberation conference will 
allow the court and defense counsel to craft effective curative 
instructions that are tailored to the specific improper arguments.  
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4. The defendant moves the Court to order that, in addition to any 
curative instructions issued by the Court, the defendant’s right to 
request a mistrial as a remedy for improper argument is preserved and 
may be exercised at any time before the jury returns its verdict. More 
specifically: 
a. Some types of improper argument “may be too clearly 
prejudicial” for even a well-crafted “curative instruction to 
mitigate their effect[.]” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 
637, 644 (1974). However, a mistrial may result in a retrial, 
which can be costly for a defendant both in terms of his money 
and, when unable to post bail, his liberty. That is, even though a 
“[m]istrial is the only remedy certain to ensure that the 
prejudicial conduct will not taint the ultimate verdict . . . its 
application may unfairly burden the defendant.” J. Thomas 
Sullivan, Prosecutor Misconduct in Closing Argument in 
Arkansas Trials, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 213, 219 
(1998). 
b. Given the severity of the mistrial remedy from the defendant’s 
standpoint, counsel should not request a mistrial until after 
careful consultation with the client. This can be accomplished 
after jury begins its deliberations and before it returns its verdict 
to the Court. Wisconsin law even holds that counsel may “move 
for a mistrial before the jury returns its judgment.” State v. 
Rockette, 718 N.W.2d 269, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
c. This motion in limine will also serve to put the prosecutor on 
notice that improper arguments, including those set forth below, 
will provoke the defendant’s request for a mistrial and may bar 
the state from retrying the defendant. “[I]f a defendant’s motion 
for mistrial is prompted by prosecutorial or judicial misconduct 
which was intended ‘to provoke’ defendant’s motion or was 
otherwise ‘motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or 
prejudice’ the defendant or ‘to afford the prosecution a more 
favorable opportunity to convict’ the defendant, double jeopardy 
does bar further prosecution.” State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 114, 
123 (Wis. 1980). 
5. Finally, the defendant moves the Court for a pretrial order that the 
prosecutor not engage in the following forms of argument: 
a. If the defendant testifies, argument that the defendant has a 
motive to lie because [he or she] is charged with a crime and/or 
is facing a criminal conviction.  
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i Such an argument would render meaningless the defendant’s 
constitutional right to testify in his or her own defense, and 
would contradict the Court’s instruction to the jury that “[t]he 
defendant has testified in this case, and you should not 
discredit the testimony just because the defendant is charged 
with a crime.” Wis. Crim. J.I. 300.  
ii Such an argument is improper because it “impl[ies] that a 
defendant is presumed to lie simply because of her status as a 
defendant” and because it “diminish[es] the defendant’s 
fundament right to the presumption of innocence.” People v. 
Crowder, 607 N.E.2d 277, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).  
b. If the defendant does not testify, direct or indirect comment on 
the defendant’s silence during and/or before trial.  
i First, “comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 
inquisitorial system of criminal justice, which the Fifth 
Amendment outlaws.” Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 
614 (1965). This includes “indirect comments, including 
references to ‘uncontroverted’ testimony, when . . . the only 
one who could have controverted it was the defendant who 
remained silent throughout trial.” United States v. Cotnam, 88 
F.3d 487, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1996).  
ii Second, when the defendant does not testify, his/her silence 
before trial, whether pre- or post-Miranda, is not admissible 
and comment thereon would also violate the Fifth 
Amendment. State v. Mayo, 734 N.W.2d 115, 127 (Wis. 
2007).  
c. If the defendant testifies, accusations that the defendant “lied” or 
is “a liar,” or other inflammatory name-calling. Branding the 
defendant a liar is inflammatory name-calling that usurps the 
jury’s role and duty “to weigh the testimony of witnesses” and 
decide witness credibility. Wis. Crim. J.I. 300. Similarly, other 
name calling is “not relevant” and “highly prejudicial.” State v. 
Jorgensen, 754 N.W.2d 77, 88 (Wis. 2008) (reversing conviction 
for prosecutor’s argument that defendant was “chronic 
alcoholic”). 
d. Disparaging defense counsel or counsel’s role in the criminal 
justice system. For example, the argument that “defense 
counsel’s job is to get his client off the hook,” and similar 
arguments, are “improper and deserving of condemnation.” State 
v. Mayo, 734 N.W.2d 115, 121-22 (Wis. 2007). See also United 
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States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (“disparaging 
remarks directed at defense counsel are reprehensible” and could 
lead “the jury to believe that the defense’s characterization of the 
evidence should not be trusted”).  
e. Vouching, including the expression of a personal opinion about a 
witness’s truthfulness or the guilt of the defendant.  
i First, “A lawyer shall not in trial . . . assert personal 
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a 
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a 
cause, the credibility of a witness, . . . or the guilt or 
innocence of an accused.” Wis. SCR 20:3.4(e).  
ii Second, it is also improper to vouch for a witness by 
referencing matters not in evidence. For example, it is 
improper to vouch for police-officer witnesses by telling the 
jury, “They work hard. They do a tough job. . . . They work 
long, long hours. You weigh their testimony against the 
defendant’s.” State v. Smith, 671 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2003).  
f. Argument that incorporates facts not presented in the evidentiary 
portion of trial. “[I]t is improper for a prosecutor to provide the 
jury with information, which allows the jury to consider facts not 
in evidence when determining guilt.” State v. Jorgensen, 754 
N.W.2d 77, 88 (Wis. 2008) (reversing conviction for 
prosecutorial misconduct, including prosecutorial “testimony” in 
closing argument that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine).  
g. Argument that misstates the law, including but not limited to the 
state’s burden of proof. 
i For example, arguing that the jury should “search for the 
truth” is improper because it “misstates the jury’s duty and 
sweeps aside the State’s burden.” State v. Berube, 286 P.3d 
402, 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). “‘[S]eeking the truth’ 
suggests determining whose version of events is more likely 
true, the government’s or the defendant’s, and thereby 
intimates a preponderance of evidence standard.” United 
States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir. 
1994). This distinction is accurately captured by Vermont’s 
instruction to its jurors stating that, if they have a reasonable 
doubt, they must find the defendant “not guilty even if [they] 
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think that the charge is probably true.” Vt. Crim. Jury 
Instructions, Reasonable Doubt.  
ii Even prosecutors admit that jury trials are not searches for the 
truth. For example, when a defendant is acquitted at trial and 
the state later tries to use the facts underlying that acquittal as 
“other acts” evidence in a subsequent trial, prosecutors have 
argued, and Wisconsin courts have held, that “an acquittal 
only establishes that there was a reasonable doubt in the 
jury’s mind as to whether the defendant committed the prior 
crime, not that the defendant is innocent.” State v. Landrum, 
528 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). 
h. Argument that creates “straw men” or misstates the defendant’s 
theory of defense. For example, when the defense argues that the 
police-officer witnesses were mistaken about the perpetrator’s 
identity, the prosecutor is not allowed to misstate this defense by 
arguing, “While defense attorneys try and say, well, we’re not 
saying the police are lying; what else are they saying?” This 
straw-man argument improperly expresses “the prosecutor’s 
self-imposed frustration at his own . . . suggestion that testifying 
police officers may have lied.” State v. Smith, 671 N.W.2d 854, 
858 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing conviction). 
i. Argument that invokes the emotions of the jurors or directly or 
indirectly invites them to decide the case on matters outside of 
the evidence. Arguments “appealing to the jurors’ emotions and 
inviting the jury to consider the social consequences of its 
verdict” are improper. United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 85, 90 
(7th Cir. 1997). More broadly, “[c]omments that invite 
conviction for reasons other than because the defendant was 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are improper.” United 
States v. Severson, 3 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 1993). 
j. In rebuttal, argument that goes beyond the scope of the defense 
counsel’s closing argument.  
i First, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument is narrow in scope: 
“rebuttal shall be limited to matters raised by [defense 
counsel] in argument.” WIS. STAT. § 805.10 (2017). 
ii Second, improper arguments are not justified—and in fact are 
most harmful—in the rebuttal portion of closing. And for the 
prosecutor to justify improper argument under the “invited 
response” doctrine, all of the following must be true: (1) there 
first was an improper argument by defense counsel; (2) the 
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prosecutor “objected to the defense counsel’s improper 
statements with a request that the court give a timely warning 
and curative instruction to the jury”; and (3) the curative 
instruction was insufficient. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 
1, 13 (1985) (holding prosecutor’s improper argument was 
not an invited response due to failure to object to defense 
counsel’s improper argument).  
 
[Defense counsel’s signature block] 
[Defense counsel’s bar number] 
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APPENDIX B: CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 
The following are examples of curative instructions for improper 
arguments. The instructions can be used as a template, but must be crafted 
to the particular argument and the applicable law in the case at hand. 
A. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s argument that the defendant’s 
testimony should be discredited because he or she is charged with a 
crime and/or facing a penalty.  
“The defendant testified in this case and denied the allegation. The 
prosecutor argued or implied that you should disregard the defendant’s 
testimony because [he or she] is charged with a crime and stands to be 
convicted. This argument is not valid. If the argument were valid, then 
every defendant who denied the charges against him would be guilty 
merely because the prosecutor filed a criminal complaint. That is not the 
law. The prosecutor’s argument was therefore not proper, and you must 
disregard it entirely. As I previously instructed you, the defendant is 
presumed innocent. You must not discredit [his or her] testimony just 
because [he or she] is charged with a crime, and you may not convict [him 
or her] unless, after your deliberations, you find that the state proved every 
element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
B. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s 
decision not to testify.  
This type of improper argument does not lend itself well to a curative 
instruction, as the argument directly implicates a fundamental constitutional 
right and an instruction would merely draw additional attention to the 
defendant’s decision to remain silent. In these cases, while crafting a 
curative instruction is possible, a mistrial request should be considered. 
C. Curative instruction for prosecutor calling the defendant a liar or other 
derogatory names.  
“During closing argument, the prosecutor called the defendant a liar and 
implied that you should accept that conclusion and discredit the defendant’s 
testimony. The prosecutor’s comment was not proper, and you must 
disregard it. Issues of witness credibility are for you, the jury, to decide.” 
OR 
“During closing argument, the prosecutor called the defendant a [name 
here]. The prosecutor’s name-calling was not proper, and that kind of tactic 
is demeaning not only to the defendant but also to the Court and to these 
proceedings. You must disregard the prosecutor’s comment and base your 
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decision on the evidence or lack of evidence in this case, applying the 
burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt as I have instructed you.”  
D. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s disparaging remarks about defense 
counsel.  
“During closing argument the prosecutor said that defense counsel 
[describe derogatory comment]. This argument is not proper. It is 
demeaning not only to defense counsel but also to the Court and to these 
proceedings. The defense lawyer is a critical part of our criminal justice 
system. The state has a tremendous power and resources to pursue 
convictions, and one of the defense lawyer’s roles is to vigorously 
challenge the state’s case to protect his or her client from conviction unless 
the state can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We all benefit from a 
system where defense lawyers vigorously defend their clients. You must 
therefore disregard the prosecutor’s comments entirely, and you must reach 
your verdict after a careful consideration of the evidence or lack of 
evidence in this case, applying the burden of proof of beyond a reasonable 
doubt as I have instructed you.” 
E. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s vouching.  
This form of misconduct is so varied, and includes both direct and 
indirect forms of vouching, that any curative instruction must be 
specifically tailored to the particular improper argument.  
F. Curative instruction for prosecutor’s argument incorporating facts not in 
evidence. 
“In closing argument the prosecutor said [describe prosecutor 
‘testimony’]. However, the purpose of closing argument is for the lawyers 
to discuss evidence that was introduced at trial. The prosecutor’s statement 
that [describe prosecutor ‘testimony’] was never introduced at trial, and the 
defense lawyer had no chance to cross-examine it or to present evidence to 
disprove it. You must therefore disregard the prosecutor’s statements on 
this matter and instead base your verdict only on the evidence or the lack of 
evidence from the trial.” 
G. Curative instruction for prosecutor misstating the burden of proof. 
“The prosecutor argued that [describe prosecutor argument]. This 
argument misstates the burden of proof. The law, as I have instructed you, 
is as follows. You must start with the presumption that the defendant is 
innocent of the charge against him. The state has the burden to prove each 
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and every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if, 
after your deliberations, you conclude that the allegation against the 
defendant is probably true, that is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt and 
you must therefore find the defendant not guilty.” 
H. Curative instruction for the prosecutors’ straw-man arguments and/or 
misstating the defendant’s theory of defense.  
“The prosecutor argued to you that [describe prosecutor argument], and 
then attributed this argument to defense counsel. That was not proper. 
Defense counsel never argued that [describe prosecutor’s argument]. You 
must therefore disregard the prosecutor’s comments. The theory of the 
defense in this case is [describe actual theory of defense]. You must return a 
verdict of not guilty unless, after your deliberations, you find that the state 
proved every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
I. Curative instruction for prosecutor arguments invoking juror emotions. 
This type of improper argument does not lend itself well to a curative 
instruction, as it is particularly difficult to “un-ring the bell” once emotions 
have been stirred. For example, prosecutor arguments that society, children, 
or even the jurors themselves will be at risk of harm if the defendant is 
acquitted are highly damaging. In these cases, while crafting a curative 
instruction might be possible, a mistrial request should seriously be 
considered.  
J. Curative instruction for prosecutor arguments going beyond the scope of 
rebuttal.  
1. If the prosecutor went beyond the scope of rebuttal but merely 
repeated an otherwise proper argument made in his or her first closing 
argument, a curative instruction is not likely to be effective; further, trial 
judges may be unwilling to give an instruction under these circumstances.  
2. If the prosecutor went beyond the scope of rebuttal by making a new, 
but otherwise proper, argument, an instruction explaining the purpose of 
rebuttal, combined with a directive to disregard the prosecutor’s comment, 
may be effective.  
3. If the prosecutor went beyond the scope of rebuttal by making an 
improper argument, the curative instruction would include the language in 
Instruction J.2., above, and the instruction’s substance would depend on the 
specific form of improper argument (see Instructions A.–I., above). 
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